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ABSTRACT 
The United States (U.S.) has the best-trained and equipped military in the world; 
however; these factors do not necessarily equate to success in operations.  Information is 
a vital component of warfare that facilitates success.  Electronic warfare (EW) 
organizations in the U.S. military are tasked to control battlefield information flow 
throughout the range of military operations.  Historically, the U.S. has effectively 
accomplished this mission; however, recent events reveal symptoms of a decline in 
America’s ability to exploit, attack, and protect information systems.  This thesis 
executed a contingency theory based organizational analysis of command level EW 
organizations responsible for EW plans and management within the Department of 
Defense.  The collective assessment using the combined open systems model and 
ORGCON (Burton et al., 1998) expert system revealed the organization has not 
adequately adjusted to the dynamic environment of the twenty first century.  
Implementation of recommended changes to the EW strategic task, leadership rank 
structure, education system, and division of EW may assist the U.S. military to maintain 
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Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls 
topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders.           
- Ronald Reagan, June 14, 1989 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the United States (U.S.) military command 
level organizational structure within the Department of Defense (DoD) responsible for 
planning and management of the electronic warfare (EW) mission.  Even though the U.S. 
military is, the best trained and equipped military in the world, there have been recent 
symptoms of decline in their capability to execute mission to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum environment (EME) and protect U.S. information.  This analysis investigated 
the impact of the formal structure in which command level EW organizations within the 
EW community are tasked to manage, plan, and facilitate execution of EW operations.  
Successful accomplishments of these tasks are required to ensure U.S. information flow 
advantages in the 21st century.   
B. ROLE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE  
Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (2001, Amended 2007), defines electronic warfare as “military action 
involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum (EM) or to attack the enemy” (p. 177).  EME control is the mission or strategic 
task of the EW community.  JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, identifies the method to 
achieve the task is to “exploit and attack an adversary’s information flow while 
protecting access to and use of U.S. information” (p. V, I-2).  Extending President 
Reagan’s “information is oxygen” metaphor, electronic warfare can be viewed as the 
cardiovascular system responsible for exchanging and supplying the DoD body with 
information.  The information is supplied to the hands, where soldiers and battlefield 
commanders thrust their tactical spears, and to the brain, where information is used to  
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influence international strategic policy.  Regulating the information flow is essential for 
sustained success at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare and 
ultimately the national security of the U.S. 
The EW mission is divided into three missions: Electronic Warfare Support (ES), 
Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic Protect (EP).  ES is responsible for searching, 
intercepting, identifying, and locating adversary information.  EA is charged with 
attacking adversary equipment, personnel, and facilities with intent to degrade, neutralize 
or destroy adversary capabilities to share information.  While EP is assigned the task of 
protecting American equipment, personnel, and facilities associated with providing U.S. 
information against adversary EA efforts (JP 3-13, p. II-4).  Information flow is defined 
as information transmitted from one source (sender) to another (receiver) over some 
channel (Denning, 2007).  The laws of physics constrain information channels to the 
electromagnetic spectrum environment1 (EME).  Therefore, EME control equates to 
control of the flow of information.  Since the EW community is assigned the strategic 
task of “controlling the EME” (JP 3-13.1, 2007) its mission is to regulate the information 
flow.  Recent events have exposed symptoms that U.S. military is unable to control the 
EME and regulate information flow. 
C. SYMPTOMS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE DECLINE 
The U.S. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 in response 
to military deficiencies exposed during three events in the early nineteen-eighties.  These 
events were the failed 1981 Iranian Hostage rescue attempt, the inter-service coordination 
and communication failures following the 1983 Beirut, Lebanon Marine barracks 
bombing, and the interoperability problems experienced during the 1983 Grenada 
mission (Parlier, 1989).  The goal of the GNA reorganization was to “do a better job of 
employing and organizing our [American] military forces” (Parlier, 1989).  The 
                                                 
1 Graphical depictions of the electromagnetic spectrum and basic information on the structure and use 
of the EM spectrum can be found at the following link retrieved October 25, 2007 from 
http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/science/know_l1/emspectrum.html.  A subcomponent of he EME most 
often used  by the EW discipline is the radio spectrum.  The radio spectrum is regulated in the U.S. by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  The U.S. Radio Spectrum 
Frequency Allocation chart can be found at the following site retrieved October 25, 2007 from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.  
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following are three indicators that expose deficiencies in the employment and 
organization of EW.  These indicators can be viewed as symptoms that America is 
declining in its ability to effectively exploit, attack, and protect the EME in the twenty-
first century.   
The first indicator is the U.S. was not able to use ES effectively to exploit 
adversary information flow and subvert the terrorist attacks against the United States on 
September 11, 2001.  Terrorists took advantage of modern communications technology, 
influence of transnational non-state actors, and the loss of distinction between military 
and civilian targets to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities in controlling the information flow. 
(Shultz Jr., Richard H. & Beitler, 2004, p. 57).   
The second indicator was exposed by the problems the U.S. military have had 
trying to counter terrorist use of radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (C-
RCIEDs) in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) (Fulghum, 2005).  
Soldiers were injured and killed because the U.S. did not initially employ EA effectively 
to counter the RCIED.  Simultaneously, an EP failure occurred because these EA systems 
also targeted U.S. command and control communications (Fulghum, 2007).   
The U.S. government’s acknowledgement of TITAN RAIN is the third indicator 
that can be construed as a symptom of EW inadequacy.  TITAN RAIN is the original 
code name for the systematic intrusion into DoD contractor and military sites by Chinese 
based hackers (Thornburgh, 2005).  The U.S. has not been able to protect electronic 
information systems from international intrusion. 
Individually these indicators are alarming.  Combined they represent cataclysmic 
symptoms of potential impending failure of the U.S. to execute the EW ‘exploit, attack, 
and protect’ missions (Huber, et al., 2007).  These symptoms of EW decline was the 
catalyst for this thesis.   
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I is the introduction where the 
thesis purpose is identified.  This is followed by a brief discussion of the mission and 
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tasks of electronic warfare assigned by the Department of Defense and formalized in joint 
publications.  Additional examples are provided to illustrate symptoms of the EW decline 
that can affect national security.  Finally, research methodology and rationale for 
focusing the research scope to an analysis of command level EW organization within the 
EW community is discussed. 
Chapter II provides the reader a brief literature review on organizational design 
and introduces a combined open systems model developed for this analysis.  The model 
is developed by incorporating components of the “Leavitt Diamond” (1965) model and 
the Mercer Delta presented Congruence model developed by Nadler and Tushman 
(1998).  Components of the model and key terms of organizational design are identified 
and defined in this chapter. 
In Chapter III, the current structure of command level EW organizations are 
placed into the context of the combined open systems model.  Information from joint 
publications, Department of Defense instructions, and interviews with personnel in 
command level EW staff positions are used to place command level EW organizations in 
the context of the model. 
Chapter IV is the analysis of the “fit” or congruence between components within 
the model.  The terms fit and congruence are used synonymously in the thesis.  Nadler 
and Tushman (1998) define fit as: 
Determining how the various internal and external variables related to an 
organization interact and adapt to achieve the output goal of the 
organization.  These variables include the external operating environment 
and internal organizational components of work, people, structure, 
technology, and strategy. (p. 9) 
Analysis for command level EW organizations iss conducted by assessing the fit between 
components based on the contextual information identified in Chapter III.  This analysis 
is based on joint publication defined structure and formalized tasks, historical review of 
inputs affecting EW, and interviews with JEWC personnel.  In conjunction with the 
combined open systems model analysis, Burton and Obel’s (1998) diagnostic software 
package, Organizational Consultant (ORGCON), is used to determine the organizational 
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fit.  The ORGCON analysis is performed using two different periods to determine if the 
organization has effectively adapted to the dynamic environment.  The first period 
analyzes the structure of the joint EW community as it existed between 1986 through the 
end of the 1991 Gulf War.  This fit analysis is then compared to the second period 
extending from post 1991 Gulf War to today’s twenty-first century environment. 
Finally, Chapter V contains observations from the fit analysis and provides 
recommendations for the organization.  These recommendations are necessarily limited 
and are suggestive.  They are based on limited resources and a moderate level of 
knowledge of the joint manning documents, training procedures, and mission 
requirements.  However, they should be sufficient to provoke discussion. 
E. RESEARCH SCOPE  
The lens used to focus the research is organizational contingency theory 
(Donaldson, 2001).  “Fit” or congruence between components of command level EW 
organizations within the DoD structure was examined.  Analysis was focused on 
determining the organizations ability to effectively adjust to dynamic changes in 
resources, technology, and environment.  Command level EW organizations are defined, 
for this analysis, as components responsible for operational level management and 
planning of EW.  These components include Joint Command EW staff (JCEWS) at 
regional unified combatant commanders (COCOM) and/or Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Commander headquarters; any variation of an EW Coordination Cells (EWCC) 
established by these commands; members of the Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) 
at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio; and the individual U.S. Air Force (AF), Navy, 
Marines, and Army service branch command level EW staff.  Figure 1 represents the 
DoD structure for command level EW organizations.  The black cells represent the main 
command level EW organizations assessed.  Military components executing the physical 
missions of EW and operating the EW widgets are referred to as tactical EW or EW 
operators.  Command level EW organizations and EW operators work together to try to 




Figure 1.   Joint Structure of the Command Level Electronic Warfare Organization 
(Derived from Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare, 2007) 
Martin Libicki (1995), from the RAND Corporation, declares that DoD’s assigned 
strategic task of controlling the EME is impractical and “self-defeating” (Ch.11, p. 3)  
Libicki (1995) says it is counterproductive because “in all aspects of EW, supremacy will 
only be local and thus have tactical implications at best” (Ch. 11, p. 2).  This declaration 
means the entire EW community has been tasked to accomplish a mission that is 
physically unachievable in today’s information age.  Evolutions in information 
technology (IT) have led to massive quantities and variation of inexpensive, yet powerful 
information systems that operate over a wide spread of the electromagnetic spectrum.  
Additionally, changes in warfare and lower equipment costs have led to the merger of 
military and commercial information systems.  This merger has obscured the distinction 
between friendly and adversary systems.  This merger further complicates the tasks of 
EW.  Even though the analytical focus is on EW planning and management at the 
command level, the impractical strategic task of spectrum “control” consistently affects 
their ability to accomplish the mission.  The strategic task drives DoD strategy, program 
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management, acquisition, and tactical employment of EW.  Implications of the strategic 
task of EW is discussed only on a limited basis because the analytical focus remains on 
command level EW organizations and their task to plan and manage  
The analysis is limited also to the DoD defined formal structure of command level 
EW organizations.  This limitation removes the variable created by “informal 
organizations.”  Informal organizations are defined as the “pattern of processes, practices, 
and political relationships that embod[y] values, beliefs, and accepted behavioral norms 
of the individuals that work for the company” (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 8).  Informal 
organizations are developed to circumnavigate inadequate or irrelevant formal processes 
or structures.  This flexibility to avoid inadequate formal processes makes informal 
organizations powerful.   
Successful formal organizations that effectively adapt to dynamic environments 
harness this power.  Informal organizations assessed as effective are incorporated into 
formal structure based on their successful adaptation to changes in inputs, work, strategy, 
and people. (Lawler, Edward E. Worley, Christopher G., 2006, p. 120).  The rationale for 
excluding the informal organization in this analysis is to minimize internal dynamic 
components of an organization.  Informal organizations can mask formal organizational 
design flaws.   
The goal of this analysis is to evaluate if the formal structure of the command 
level EW organization is designed for success in the twenty first century.  Executing a 
structural analysis limits the investigation into the effect of military human resource 
management.  Including human resource management would provides insight into the 
impact of personnel selection, placement, promotion practices, rewards, performance 
appraisal, training, and education on the militaries ability to accomplish the mission 
(Burton et al., 1998, p. 111).  Aspects of training, job placement, and education are 
discussed on a limited basis as they affect the structural components, but they are not the 
focus of the analysis. 
The analysis is chronologically restricted to the last twenty-one years.  The 
current formal command level organizational structure was established within DoD by 
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the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.  Over these twenty-one years, significant developments 
in the evolution of communication technology, warfare and international political events 
created a natural break following the 1991 Gulf War.  Developments that created the 
natural chronological break in 1991 for assessment of command level EW organizations 
are identified in Chapter III. 
The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Theory (2003) states “traditional 
command and control forms of organization that predominated in the twentieth century 
industry failed to respond quickly and creatively enough to the developing demands of 
consumers and to emerging market opportunities (p. 558)”.  The DoD is organized as a 
traditional command and control (C2) structure.  This analysis focuses on the EW 
component of the DoD C2 structure to determine the EW’s ability to adapt quickly and 
creatively to external changes.  In 2006, the National Security Strategy established a 
direct correlation between information flow and national security (p. 47).  Since EW is 
responsible for controlling the EME and information flow, if it fails to adapt “quickly and 
creatively” to the environment, national security could be at risk.  The aforementioned 
examples of EW deficencies are symptoms that the organization may be stagnant and 
unable to adapt to the dynamic twenty-first century environment.  The Oxford Handbook 
of Organizational Theory (2003) warns organizational stagnation can result in a “future 
of declining power and influence” (p. 562).  In an attempt to minimize any decline of 
American power and influence in the twenty-first century, this theoretical analysis of the 
command level structure of EW within the DoD organization is presented. 
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II. OVERVIEW AND BASIC CONCEPTS 
If we are organized to do one mission, it means we are not organized to do 
all missions.  
– Dr. Gordon H. McCormick, July 5, 2007 
A. THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE OPEN SYSTEMS AND 
CONTINGENCY MODELS 
Two open systems models are combined to structure the organizational analysis 
of the command level EW organizations.  Results are used in conjunction with analyses 
from Burton and Obel’s (1998) Organizational Consultant (ORGCON) expert system to 
assess command level EW organizational structure.  The following is a brief review of 
these models. 
Conceptualized in the nineteen fifties, the organizational application of theorist 
Ludwig von Bertalanaffy’s (2003) open systems model focuses on determining how an 
organization maintains its ability to achieve its goal while adjusting to dynamic changes 
in external and internal events.  The theory has four main assumptions.  First, the intent 
of any organization is to maximize efficiency in achieving its goals.  Second, modern day 
organizations cannot be closed.  Environmental influences including energy sources, 
communication networks, product or service delivery, political demands, and financial 
constraints require organizations to adapt and respond to its environment.  Third, large 
organizations are “comprised of multiple subsystems, each of which receive inputs from 
other subsystems and turn them into outputs for use by other subsystems” (Nadler & 
Tushman, 1998, p. 6).  And fourth, a failure in one subsystem does not mean failure for 
the whole organization.   
The combined open systems model developed for this analysis integrates elements 
of the “Leavitt Diamond Model” and the “Nadler-Tushman or Mercer Delta Congruency 
Model.”  The Leavitt Diamond was presented in Leavitt’s (1965) paper “Applied 
Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, Technological, and Humanistic 
Approaches.”  Organizational theorists Nadler and Tushman developed the Congruency 
Model, which later was modified slightly by Nadler’s consulting firm: Mercer Delta 
 10 
(1998).  The combined open systems model is the primary means for organizing the 
analysis of command level EW organizations.  Components of the combined systems 
model and definitions of key terms are discussed in the next section. 
Contingency theory co-evolved with the open systems theory.  In Organization 
Design (1977), Jay A. Galbraith explains that organizational contingency theory 
postulates that (1) there is no best way to organize and lead or make decisions in an 
organization and (2) not all organizations are equally effective.  Determining external fit 
issues between the organization and the environment, as well as identifying the internal 
fit issues between organizational subsystems is required to identify ‘better’ organizational 
designs (Galbraith, 1977, p. 28-29).  Research into contingency theory has begun to 
develop a set of propositions about congruent relationships.  These provide a foundation 
for making design recommendations based on factors such as size, technology, strategy, 
environment, and management preferences (Burton et al., 1998, pp. 14-15).  
Organizational theorists, Burton and Obel, developed the expert system ORGCON 
software that is based on these propositions (Burton et al., 1998).   
ORGCON is designed to provide a general diagnostic analysis of an organization.  
An ORGCON analysis is based on the answers to multiple-choice questions posed by the 
expert system to assess the values of specific variables.  These specific variables relate to 
propositions identified in contingency theory such as organizational structure, climate, 
environment, and personnel. ORGCON’ questions ask for a confidence level for each 
answer.  Since the system is designed for analysis of a wide range of organizations, the 
system allows the operator to respond “not applicable” to questions that do not apply.  
Including the confidence level for each response enables the system to weight responses 
when conducting the analysis.  Appendix E contains a list of questions posed by the 
ORGCON and includes the responses selected for this analysis.  ORGCON’s output is a 
fit analysis with design recommendations2.  This thesis includes the ORGCON  
 
                                                 
2 Execution of the analysis using the software is relatively simple; however the theory behind the 
design of the software is rather in-depth.  For more information reference Burton and Obel Strategic 
Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 2nd ed., Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston, 1998. 
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diagnostic tool to provide a second analytical approach.  It is used to evaluate the external 
and internal congruence of the command level EW fit at two periods in time: before and 
after the 1991 Gulf War.   
B.  COMBINED OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL COMPONENTS, KEY TERMS, 
AND DEFINITIONS 
As discussed earlier, the combined open systems model used integrates the 
“Leavitt Diamond Model” and Nadler and Tushman’s (1998) “Congruence Model”.  The 
model has three main components: inputs, outputs, and the transformation core.  Within 
the transformation core are the four subcomponents of task, people, formal structure, and 
technology (See Figure 2).  The following definitions of key terms describe the 
organizational structure and model components. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Combined Open Systems Model (From “Congruence Model” by Nadler & 
Tushman, 1998, p. 8 and “Leavitt Diamond” by Leavitt, 1965) 
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1.  Organizational Configuration and Structure: Key Terms 
DoD structure of command level EW organizations can be described as a 
professional machine, which is a hybrid of a machine bureaucracy and a professional 
bureaucracy.  This professional machine has a divisionalized, formalized, hierarchical 
form that operates in a complex and predominantly dynamic environment.  Definitions 
for these descriptive terms are provided below and are based on Henry Mintzberg’s 
congruence structure model.3  Appendix B contains a comprehensive summary chart of 
Henry Mintzberg’s congruence structure developed by Erik Jansen at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.   
Bureaucracy:  Administration of a government chiefly through bureaus or 
departments staffed with non-elected officials. (bureaucracy (n.d.), 2007).   
Hierarchy:  Any system of persons or things ranked one above another.  
Organizational structures with multiple layers are considered hierarchical.  
(hierarchy (n.d.), 2007) 
Formalized:  The quantity of written rules and procedures in an 
organization.  A highly formalized organization will have a lot of written 
rules and procedures which are followed relatively strictly.  
Standardization can be by position where specifications are attached to the 
job itself; by the work flow, where specifications are attached to the work 
itself; and by rules and regulations, seen in policy manuals.  (Burton et al., 
1998, pp. 5, 24) 
Machine Bureaucracy:  This bureaucracy is characterized by 
organizations where important decisions are made by the strategic apex or 
executives of the company.  Daily operations are managed by middle level 
personnel following standardized procedures.  There are many layers 
between the operating level or core of workers and the executive apex.  
Operations have a large support staff responsible for training and 
providing services like budgeting and human relations.  Additionally, a 
sizeable technostructure is responsible for establishing and maintaining 
                                                 
3 Mintzbergs congruence structure model has five parts: Strategic Apex, Middle Line, Operating Core, 
Support Staff, and Technostructure.  The Apex is responsible for determining mission and shape of 
organization.  Middle line focuses on management of internal operations.  Operating core executes daily 
tasks to accomplish the mission.  Support staff facilitates work of the core by providing training, 
administrative procedures, and services.  While the technostructure is responsible for establishing 
procedures, adapting to the environment, and evaluating output compared to the mission.  For more 
information reference: Mintzberg, H. The Structure of Organizations. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1979. 
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standards, as well as adapting to environment.  These layers are 
proportional in size to their role within the organization.  This type of 
structure is efficient and effective, however motivation and creativity is 
low.  An example of a machine bureaucracy is the McDonalds, 
corporation.  (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 75) 
Professional Bureaucracy:  This bureaucracy is characterized by a 
moderate apex responsible for a large operating core.  The operating core 
is professionally trained, indoctrinated, and adhere to professional 
standards therefore there are few middle levels of management and a small 
technostructure.  The structure is flat and usually demonstrates 
decentralized control.  Coordination is difficult.  The professional training 
keeps the individual at the forefront of their specialty; however the overall 
organization usually responds slowly to external changes.  An example of 
a professional bureaucracy is any large U.S. University or hospital.  
(Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 77) 
Divisionalized Form:  This structure is characterized as a large company 
with all five core components described by Mintzberg; however the 
operating core is divided into separate divisions all of which contain a 
smaller scale of the five core components.  Described as “quasi 
autonomous units,” the divisions can be divided along product, geography, 
or specialty lines.  Benefits of the divisionalized form are economies of 
scale and responsiveness to changes in local external inputs.  Negative 
effects include power struggles between division level apex and 
headquarters and headquarters being unresponsive to divisional 
requirements because they have lost touch with operations.  An example 
of a divisionalized form is a multi-campus university, multi-specialty 
hospital, or a Fortune 500 company with multiple products and locations 
like Proctor and Gamble. (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 77-78) 
2.  Combined Open Systems Model Components 
Inputs, outputs and the transformational core are the three main components of 
the combined open systems model.  Inputs are further divided into the following five 
impact factors: environment, resources, history, strategy, and feedback.  The output 
component for this model considers the performance of the organization as a whole.  
Feedback assessing the organization’s achieved outputs is returned as an input factor.  In 
this model the overall organizational output has been adjusted to the planning and 
management of EW instead of the strategic task of controlling the EME because of 
Libicki’s (1995) observation that the strategic task of control is unrealistic and “self-
defeating” (Ch. 11, p. 3).  The final aspect of the model is the transitional core, which 
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contains the sub components of task, people, formal organization, and technology.  The 
following are definitions and descriptions of these components. 
Output:  The output is discussed first because it is the “ultimate purpose” of an 
organization.  Nadler and Tushman state that the outputs: 
encompass the products and services produced as well as the effectiveness 
of the organization to produce the output.  Output is further divided into 
total or goods/services produced; units within a system or how each 
subdivision of an organization achieved its goals in contributing to the 
total output; and individual or behavior and performance of the people 
within the organization (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, pp 6, 7). 
This analysis identifies the goal for command level EW organizations to manage and plan 
EW to control the EME.  Organizations assess outcomes.  Assessments are fed back into 
the system and are considered another input.  Feedback mechanisms comparing outputs 
to mission goals are used to determine effectiveness.   
Feedback:  Feedback is defined as “the return of a portion of the output of 
a process or system to the input, especially when used to maintain performance or to 
control a system or process” (feedback (n.d.), 2007).   
Many times a significant loss or a crisis is required for an organization to initiate 
feedback and assess the transformation process (Lawler, Edward E. Worley, Christopher 
G., 2006, p. 3).  Successful organizations that achieve or exceed goals use feedback to 
assess the transformational process.  John Boyd, in The Essence of Winning and Losing 
(1996), presents the observe-orient-decide-act feedback process model (See Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.   John Boyd’s OODA Loop (Created  from John Boyd’s brief “The Essence of 
Winning and Losing,” 1996) 
Also known as the “OODA-loop,” this model is often used by the U.S. military to assess 
tactical operations.  Observed results of feedback are factors that affect the input 
component. 
Input:  Inputs are all the “givens” or raw materials of information and influences 
that the organization must manipulate to perform its work or task.  Output feedback is 
combined with the four input factors to define the dynamic external influence that the 
organization must adapt to in order to be successful.  The four input factors are presented 
as follows: 
Environment: The environment affects demands, constraints, and provides 
opportunities to organizations.  These opportunities are based upon the operating market, 
technological and economic conditions, competition, and authoritative bodies that 
provide oversight and regulations (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, pp. 3-4).  The environment 
includes the technology available to execute operations, how the competition uses the 
available technology, and changes in conduct or rules governing operations  
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History: Historically “the way an organization functions today is greatly 
influenced by landmark events that occurred in the past” (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 5).  
The history described in this part is restricted to the history of the organization.  This 
includes how it has traditionally operated, structured, and responded to changes. 
Resources: Resources include tangible assets like employees, money, and 
technology, as well as intangible aspects like reputation and organizational climate 
(Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 5).  Resources for this discussion are divided into two 
categories.  The first category is organic resources used by the U.S. to conduct EW 
operations.  This includes people and the EW technology used by the tactical level 
operators.  The second category is the information system resources available for use by 
adversaries.   
Strategy: The values, beliefs, and behaviors of an organization are based upon 
history and shape the strategic path chosen by leadership.  Strategy is further divided into 
corporate and business.  Corporate strategy focuses on output, which is what the 
organization will produce.  Business strategy deals with how the organization will 
configure and utilize the resources to achieve the output (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 6).   
Transformation Core: The six input factors are refined in the transformational 
core to produce outputs.  People, tasks, formal structure, and technology comprise the 
transformational core component.  Interactions between the core’s subcomponents are 
continuous and inter-dependent.  In standardizing this organizational analysis, the 
transformation core is discussed in the following order: task, formal structure, people, 
and technology.  The rationale for this order is that inputs affect the task; task are 
accomplished within the formal structure; people are assigned by the structure to 
accomplish the task; and people use technology provided by the formal structure to 
execute the task.  All of the transformational core components are impacted by and 
contribute to organizational culture.  Optimally, these components are developed, 
executed, and then modified based on feedback of the organization achieving its goal.  
The following are definitions for the transformation core components. 
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Task: Task is defined as the “basic and inherent activities engaged in by the 
organization, units, people to achieve the strategy” (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 7).  The 
tasks for command level EW organizations will be restricted to the tasks formalized in 
DoD instructions and publications. 
Formal Structure: Nadler and Tushman (1998) define formal organization as 
“structures, systems, and processes” designed to coordinate people and work to achieve 
the strategic goals (p. 8).  This includes formal training, written procedures, divisions of 
labor, and the organizations physical layout. 
People: The term ‘people’ is used to describe the characteristics of people hired 
by the organization to produce the output.  These characteristics include experience, 
knowledge, skills, and motivations (Nadler & Tushman, 1998, p. 8).   
Technology:  Technology in the transformation core is defined as the available 
resources provided by the organization to execute the mission.  Core technology is the 
tools provided to command level EW organizations to plan and manage EW.  This is 
different from technology inputs. 
Culture:  Edgar Schein defines culture as “the pattern of basic assumptions 
developed by a group in learning to cope with problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration.  These assumptions are considered valid enough to be taught to new 
members as how to perceive, think, and feel in relation to problems” (Robey, 1986, p. 
426).  Culture reflects organizational values, beliefs, and behavior patterns. 
3.  Analysis Methodology 
Two methods are used to conduct this analysis.  The first method uses the 
combined open systems model as a framework to determine fit or congruence between 
the transformational core subcomponents.  The more aligned or congruent the component 
relationships are in organization, the more likely the organization can succeed in 




systematically examining potential issues between the various sub-components of the 
transformation core.  Table 1 is the fit-issue assessment chart, derived from Nadler and 
Tushman (1998) that provided the framework for the analysis.   
 
Table 1.   Transformation Core Components “Fit-Issue” Assessment Chart (Adapted 
from Nadler and Tushman, 1998, p. 9) 
Research into Joint publications, events in EW history, and interviews are used to 
place the command level EW organization into the context of this model.  After 
completing the model context, the organizational fit issues are identified and analyzed for 
congruence.  A quick reference fit-issue assessment chart is developed for the command 
level EW organization based on the contextual analysis.  Results of this approach are 
used in conjunction the second method of analysis to develop conclusions. 
The second analytical approach uses Burton and Obel’s (1998) expert systems 
ORGCON software.  ORGCON is used to determine the adaptability of the command 
level EW organization to dynamic inputs over time.  The time analysis is divided into two 
periods.  The first period ranges from 1986 until after the 1991 Gulf War; the second 
period includes 1991 to the present day.  The rationale to separate the analysis into these 
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time frames is discussed in Chapter III.  The input to ORGCON is based on the authors’ 
responses to sixty questions posed by ORGCON that help characterize organizational 
structure, size, climate, environment, and personnel experience.  To minimize internal 
variables, the responses were answered with either 100% certainty or not answered.  
Based on these inputs, ORGCON generated a fit analysis and provided organizational 
design recommendations.  This analytical process was followed for each of the two 
periods.   
Results of ORGCON’s assessment were pooled with the combined open systems 
analysis to assess the effectiveness of design of command level EW organizations.  
Information derived from the analytical comparison is the basis for design 
recommendations.  Command level EW organizations are placed into the context of the 
combined open systems model to conduct the assessment. 
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III.   ELECTRONIC WARFARE ORGANIZATION INTO 
CONTEXT OF COMBINED OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL 
The ability of the future force to establish an “unblinking eye” over the 
battle-space through persistent surveillance will be key to conducting 
effective joint operations. 
 - National Security Council, 2006, p. 55 
Placement of command level EW organizations into the context of the combined 
open systems model is extensive because of the complex and dynamic external and 
internal variables that affect EW planning and management.  Figure 4 represents the 
contextual merger of EW into the model.  This is the roadmap for the discussions in this 
chapter. 
 




A. OUTPUTS AND FEEDBACK 
Placement of the command level EW organization into the context of the 
combined open systems model begins with the output component and associated 
feedback process.  The recognized symptoms of EW employment and organizational 
deficiencies, from the introduction, are feedback observations based on an assessment of 
the output.  Based on the definition of EW, the EW output is EME control (JP 1-02, 
2001, Amended 2007, p. 177).  The means to accomplish this output is to “attack, exploit 
and protect” the EME (JP 3-13.1, 2007, p. V, I-2).  Therefore, EW’s strategic task is to 
provide the service of EME control for the U.S. military.  The task of the command level 
EW organization is to provide this service through planning and management of EW.  
Measures of effectiveness (MOEs)4 are used to assess the organization and create 
formalized feedback for the command level EW staffs.  Prior to discussing command 
level feedback, tactical level MOE issues are discussed.  These tactical issues affect 
command level feedback.   
Development of accurate MOEs for tactical EW operations is difficult for two 
reasons.  First, MOEs can be measured in many ways and can create either positive or 
negative feedback.  Second, the EME is an open systems which impacts assessment of 
communication.  Communication expert Dr Wilbur Schramm (1954), states that 
“effective communication is achieved when the message encoded is decoded properly by 
the receiving party” (p. 5).  Successfully encoding and decoding the messages empowers 
recipients with information.  The problem with assessing EW operations that exploit, 
attack, or protect the EME, is the receiving party is hostile and does not provide direct 
feedback.  The U.S. does not know if the signal was jammed, if all the information was 
exploited, nor how many attacks were prevented.  Secondary indicators are used to 
determine EW effectiveness to compensate for the lack of direct feedback.  These 
indicators include complaints by adversaries trying to use the EM spectrum, scheduled 
actions not happening, or no intrusions on U.S. information channels.   
                                                 
4 MOE is also referred to as indicators of effectiveness 
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Tactical level MOE difficulties are amplified at the command level because 
tangible or quantifiable results cannot be accurately computed.  Traditional military 
MOEs include tangible, quantifiable measurements like number of targets destroyed, 
sorties flown, ammunition fired, or territory occupied.  The use of secondary indicators to 
assess tactical EW MOE results in ambiguities.  These ambiguities are amplified at the 
command level when they are combined to produce theater level EW MOE analysis.  
This results in a faulty feedback process. 
Feedback is also affected by the inter-service rivalries designed into the DoD 
bureaucratic structure (Zegart, 1999, pp 8, 155).  Budgets of the individual services are 
based on the systems and programs they operate.  If a particular system is effective, the 
service will receive additional money (OSD iCenter, 2007).  This competition for money 
creates inter-service rivalries.  Since MOEs can be measured in many ways, services will 
either delay feedback or select MOEs that are favorable to their own EW system.  Service 
use of biased MOEs is an attempt to influence congressional budget allocations for their 
individual EW programs.  The impact of biased feedback fueling inter-service rivalries 
over budgets and systems was exposed recently during the Army and Marine acquisition 
battles over C-RCIED equipment (Atkinson, 2007).  Impact of the inter-service rivalries 
and the budget process is discussed further in Chapter IV.   
Feedback at the command level is incorrect, inconclusive or missing because of 
tactical MOE ambiguities and bureaucratic induced delayed and/or biased feedback.  
Feedback issues and poor adjustment to feedback at the command level equates to 
inconsistent long-term management and planning of EW.  This means two things.  One, 
EW requirements are not prioritized correctly or equipment distributed appropriately; and 
two, EW systems required on the future battlefield are not acquired today.  Feedback 
inconsistencies negatively impact the mission at the tactical level.  The introductory 
events interpreted as symptoms of EW decline in the twenty-first century reflect this 
statement.  These symptoms are acute and must be addressed if the U.S. is to maintain its 
military information advantage.  Feedback assessment is combined with input factors to 
define the external dynamic environment. in the combined open systems model. 
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B. INPUTS 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the U.S. assumed the role of 
hegemonic superpower.  By the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. had globally 
demonstrated its technological superiority in war, political dominance over the Soviets, 
and economic savvy with a string of seven consecutive years of substantial growth 
(United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2007). It was also at this time that 
significant developments occurred in technology and warfare that impacted EW.  These 
developments are divided among environmental, historical, resources management, and 
strategic factors.  These are the remaining four input factors of the model. 
1. Environment 
Many factors shape the environment.  Arguably, the most significant to command 
level EW tasks is information technology and its relevance to military operations and 
warfare.   
Information technology grew slowly throughout most of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  However, an exponential increase in capability, availability, and 
affordability in information systems has been experienced since 1991.  At the start of the 
American Civil War, the telegraph was capable of transmitting thirty words per minute, 
today the computer is capable of transmitting 1.5 trillion words per minute as well as 
audio, pictures, and streaming video (Najman, 1998).  Appendix C contains a 
chronological list of significant accomplishments in technology related to EW.5  The 
rapid growth in information capacity is attributed to the microchip and microprocessor.  
Following the invention of the microprocessor by Robert Noyce in 1968, the speed and 
diversity of communications technology increased, while the cost and size decreased by a 
factor of “one million to one” (Bellis, 2007).  In 1965 futurist Gordon Moore (1965) 
published his observation that information technology, to include computing power, 
                                                 
5  Three sources for historical review of EW and information technology systems recommended by the 
author are: Alfred Price The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, Association of Old Crows, Arlington, VA, 
1984; Ron Schroer “Electronic Warfare” IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine.  Vol 18, issue 
7, July 2003, p (49-54); and Naval Post Graduate School thesis by Ali Can Kucukozyigit “Electronic 
Warfare (EW) Historical Perspective and its Relationship to Information Operations (IO)-Considerations 
for Turkey”. Monterey, CA, 2006. 
 25 
availability, and affordability, would grow exponentially6  This simple observation is 
now known as Moore’s Law of Technology.  Figure 5 illustrates Moore’s Law in relation 
to the cost and availability of EW systems since the invention of the first EW system- the 




Figure 5.   Interaction of Technology Evolution on Cost and Availability of EW systems 
between 1837 and 2007 (Derived from multiple sources and reflective of 
History of EW found in Appendix C) 
To accommodate these new, powerful information systems, the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum has also expanded.  In the 1990’s the wide spread use of 
personnel computers, cellular phones, and internet rapidly rendered obsolete traditional 
communication and storage means supplied by typewriters, file cabinets, mail, and land 
line telephone calls.  Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen coined 
the term “disruptive technology” to describe the rapid replacement of traditional means of 
performing a task (Christensen, 1996).  The persistence of disruptive technologies in 
                                                 
6 Moore’s Law has been added to by contemporary futurist Ray Kurzweil.  Kurzweil’s law of 
acceleration describes the growth as a system of evolutionary process which means the exponential growth 
of the technology evolution is also a component of the exponential growth of the human system.  This 
means the growth of the system as a whole is accelerating because there is a second order exponential 
effect.  See: March 7, 2001 post on Law of Accelerating Returns” retrieved September 26, 2007 from 
www.Kurzweilai.net. 
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information’s systems over the last fifteen years has significantly shaped how humans 
communicate and store information.  Organizational analysts Robert Naismith and 
Patricia Aburdene describe this phenomenon as a “megatrend” (Aburdene, 2006).   
The U.S. military took advantage of the megatrend in information technology in 
the middle 1990’s.  Allen Levesque, a staff scientist from General Telephone and 
Electronics, observed that by the end of the Cold War, the government acquisition 
process for military C2 and information systems became too slow and cost prohibitive 
(Levesque, 1998, p. 438).  Forced to decrease personnel and budget following the Gulf 
War, the United States military aggressively pursued better and cheaper Commercial-Off-
the-Shelf (COTS) technology for its communication and electronic warfare requirements 
(RTO/NATO, 2000).  Eventually, the commercial and military systems were merged.  
John Stanton in the June 2004 issue of National Defense states the U.S. military has 
increased the integration and dependence of the military on COTS technology to 
minimize cost and maximize effectiveness (pp. 14-1-14-5 and Kerr & McCarthy, 2000).  
Prior to the integration of COTS, targeting military communication and information 
systems was relatively easy because military and commercial targets were distinctly 
separated within the EME.   
COTS integration has resulted in hybrid information systems used by the military 
for command and control.  Hybridization of commercial and military information systems 
greatly complicates the EW task of targeting hostile or adversarial systems for 
exploitation or attack.  Problems with countering hybrid information systems were first 
seen in 1999 during Operation Allied Force.  Allies reported difficulties in targeting 
technologically advanced frequency agile radios, COTS radios, computers, and cellular 
phones used by the adversary for command, control, and coordination of air and ground 
defense (Bolkcom, 2001).  The U.S. military strategy shift to integrate COTS 
aggressively into operations following the Gulf Wars is the first of four reasons the end 
of the 1991 Gulf War is the time selected to divide the expert system ORGCON analysis.  
U.S. adversaries have also taken advantage of Moore’s Law to improve their information 
systems.  This has resulted in a generational shift in the conduct of warfare. 
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In 1989, Lind, et al. authored “The Changing Face of Warfare: Into the Fourth 
Generation.”  This article hypothesized that the combined impact of the end of the Cold 
War, technological evolutions, integration of commercial and military information 
systems, and rise of terrorist organizations with a transnational base would lead to a new 
or fourth generation of warfare (Lind, et al., 1989).  The existing or third generation of 
warfare is characterized by symmetric conflicts with conventional battles against state 
actors.  Conversely, the fourth generation includes asymmetric conflicts using 
unconventional tactics and forces by non-state or failing state actors.  These conflicts can 
target state or non-state actors.  Figure 6 is an illustration of the different generations of 
warfare.   
 
Figure 6.   Evolution of Warfare from the Viewpoint of Core States and Nuclear Powers 




Lind, et al.,’s predictions have been verified as the rise of non-state transnational 
organizations using new communication technologies and terrorism tactics is the current 
focus of the U.S. military.  Marc Sageman, (2004) in Understanding Terror Networks, 
describes how the Islamic transnational terror organization of Al Qaeda has executed 
fourth generation warfare effectively using the internet for command, control, and 
coordination.  Internet communications facilitated the planning of 1993, 1998, 2001, and 
2003 terrorist bombings in the U.S., Africa, and Europe.  The internet was also the 
primary means Osama Bin Laden used to issue the infamous 1996 fatwa declaring war on 
America.  The internet has also figured prominently in the current insurgency operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Asymmetrical tactics and ideological themes are predominate 
descriptors of conflicts around the globe since the end of the 1991 Gulf War 
(McCormick, 2007).  Asymmetrical tactics; increased computing power; and the 
hybridization of commercial and military information systems have negated the 
information advantage once reserved by powerful nation states.  Emergence of the fourth 
generation of warfare following the end of the Gulf War is the second reason 1991 is 
chosen as the year to separate ORGCON analysis.   
2.  History 
Like any organization with over twenty years of success, the history of the DoD 
structured command level EW organization is extensive and diverse. This section is 
narrowed to the historical perspective of classifying EW systems and inter-service 
rivalries on the management and planning of EW. 
Historically, the capabilities and tactical equipment executing EW operations 
have been classified to restrict access.  Restricted access is required to ensure security of 
EW systems and products.  EW system capabilities exposure can severely degrade the 
information advantage and threaten national security (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 11).  Highly 
classified World War II EW efforts include Sir Watson-Watts development of Radio 
Detection and Ranging (RADAR) (Price & Association of Old Crows, 1984, p. 7) and the 
breaking of the German ENIGMA and the Japanese MAGIC codes.  These EW  
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events were shrouded in secrecy, but are credited with providing the allies a substantial 
information advantage that led to victory in 1945 (Jones, 1978).  However, there are two 
problems caused by the restricted access to EW.   
The first problem is restricted access.  Corporate knowledge on the systems and 
information produced by the systems is restricted to those that have access.  According to 
Mintzberg, organizations with sections that have restricted access create an internal 
hostile environment and virtually restrict information into pockets or stovepipes, which 
hinders organizational effectiveness (Mintzberg, 1979).  The second problem is limited 
accessibility of information.  Restricted access means a smaller organization and pool of 
experts.  This smaller group is suspect to group think and cultural biases found within a 
small cohesive, homogenous group (Janis, Mann, & Joint Author, 1977).  Cultural biases 
leads to inaccurate requirements and effectiveness assessments.  The impact on planning 
and management of EW is amplified by inter-service rivalries because of these internal 
hostilities and biased EW assessments,. 
Components of command level EW organizations are established within the 
structure of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) under Title 10 requirements.  Additionally, 
command level EW tasks force a close relationship with Nationals Security Agency 
(NSA).  The history of the JCS and NSA organizations impacts command level EW 
effectiveness.  Both the JCS and NSA were redundantly structured on purpose to ensure 
“competitive analysis” between organizations (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 13).  Amy Zegart 
(1999) in Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC adds these 
bureaucratic institutions were “born out of political conflicts and compromises from self 
interested players” (p. 8).  The result of the political conflicts and compromises is 
decentralized, divisional organizational structure.  The rationale for this design is two-
fold.  First, each service was guaranteed a share in any military action, even at the 
“expense of overall effectiveness and efficiency” (Zegart, 1999, p. 154).  Second, “a 
decentralized, inefficient military meant more defense spending, which leads to more 
jobs and votes in Congressional districts” (Zegart, 1999, p. 155).  The defense budgeting 
process and divisional structure is the fiscal component to inter-service rivalries.   
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Money is divided between services and geographic command components.  Each 
of these components must accomplish a cost-benefit analysis of internal systems and 
programs that drive strategy.  EW systems that do not directly contribute to individual 
service missions or EW missions that are performed better by other agencies are cut from 
the budget to eliminate waste.  Service scrutiny to cut individuals systems or programs is 
increased when Congress restricts their individual budgets.  Budget and personnel 
decreases, imposed by Congress after the 1991 Gulf War, resulted in the pursuit of a 
technology focused, air-centric EW strategy.  Rationale for the strategy was based on the 
imposed budget constraints and an incorrect assumption based on a lesson observed from 
the Gulf War.  The lesson observed was that technology driven airborne EW would 
satisfy future EW requirements.  The assumption was the continuation of third generation 
warfare tactics (Bolkcom, 2001).  This rationale became the justification for the U.S. 
Army to eliminate the EW officer specialty code.  The Air Force and Navy assumed the 
primary role as executors of the EW mission.  The U.S. Army’s elimination of the EW 
officer significantly contributed to the EW problems experienced by U.S. ground troops 
employing CRCIED measures in Iraq and Afghanistan (Atkinson, 2007).  Recently, the 
U.S. Army has made strides to rectify this decision with the establishment of the new 
Army EW officer specialty code and course (Pitts, April 24, 2007).   
The Army was not the only service to pay consequences for the air-centric EW 
strategy following the Gulf War.  Each of the services followed what can be called a 
specialization plan.  Individual services pursue EW capabilities and assets based on their 
specialty needs.  The Navy pursued the EA-18G as a new airborne EW asset to replace 
the aging EA-6B fleet (Gershanoff, 2002).  The Air Force has hedged its bet on the joint 
concept of an EW “system of systems” and the advanced electronic systems on the F-22 
Raptor to satisfy future EW requirements (Fulghum, 2007).  Service specific EW 
management has not effectively met the needs of the U.S. military because America has 
been involved predominantly in fourth generation conflicts.  Airborne EW assets cannot 
effectively meet the sustained needs of the ground forces fighting asymmetrical conflicts.  
The 2001 Airborne Electronic Warfare report to Congress and the C-RCIED jamming 
problems in Iraq exposed by Fulghum acknowledge the limitations of an air-centric EW 
 31 
strategy (Bolkcom, 2001 and Fulghum, 2007).  The post Gulf War service specific EW 
efforts, which intensified inter-service rivalries, is the third reason 1991 was selected as 
the separation time frame to execute the ORGCON analysis of command level EW 
organizations.  
3. Resources 
Resources discussed in this section do not include the resources discussed in the 
transformation core’s technology subcomponent.  The resources discussed here are 
divided into three areas: (1) the actual widgets used by tactical EW operators, (2) the 
resources available to the adversary that uses the EM spectrum to pass information, and 
(3) money available to purchase widgets to counter or exploit adversary systems and 
protect U.S. systems.   
Information technology evolutions not only have increased the total amount and 
variety of information systems available, but also spread coverage of the EM spectrum 
used to transmit the information.  The large quantity and a wide variety of information 
systems across a wide spectrum used by both military and commercial entities in 
asymmetrical conflicts have significantly complicated the EW task of EME control.  
Command level EW organizations are forced to make important cost-benefit resource 
management choices because of the increased complexity.  U.S. EW systems cannot 
cover the variety and breadth required to control the entire EME as experienced in World 
War II (Price & Association of Old Crows, 1984). 
The historical review showed that the service branches have independently 
invested in tactical EW assets based on their specific missions and requirements.  Most of 
the time, EW system acquisition occurs internally in the stove-piped service structure.  
This means EW systems may not be tested to determine interoperability with other 
systems used in joint operations.  Interoperability failures can result in operational 
complications and even death.  This is seen in the introductory examples of the Iranian 
failed hostage rescue and the current C-RCIED problems (Parlier, 1989 and Fulghum, 
2007).  Interoperability failures can be minimized through proper acquisition and testing 
of equipment.  However, this can lead to a catch-22 situation if the acquisition process 
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and testing delay fielding of critical equipment.  This is why the management and 
planning role of command level EW organizations is so pivotal to the success of 
operations. 
Projected EW requirements submitted by tactical operators and managed by 
command level EW organizations initiate the acquisition process.  Individual service EW 
staffs provide inputs to acquire widgets required to execute tactical mission using the 
bureaucratic DoD acquisition process.  Actual acquisition and fielding of a system can 
take from one year, for rapid fielding, up to 20 years for the formal process (Griffard, 
2002).  It is likely, the widgets the U.S. purchases to execute EW operations are 
antiquated or ineffective by the time they are fielded.  Forth generation warfare 
adversaries are not restricted to an acquisition process and purchases of improved COTS 
systems are restrained only by their operating budget. 
Trying to match the adversary’s acquisition process is unrealistic for America.  
The U.S. must operate within its allotted budget and bureaucratic constraints.  The 
problem of trying to keep up with adversarial capabilities can be mitigated with insight 
into future EW development and effective management of EW systems.  The different 
systems available around the world further compound the management of the EW 
problem imposed by the bureaucratic acquisition process.  Information systems used in 
one town, country, and/or region of the world are not the same as in other towns, 
countries or regions.  Therefore, command level EW offices are faced with the difficult 
challenge of trying to be flexible to respond to the latest threat while being restricted to 
the rigid fiscal budgeting process.  The diversity and quantity of information systems 
available and employed by adversaries further supports the notion that the strategic task 
of EME control is impossible in the twenty-first century.  The U.S. does not have enough 
organizational flexibility, resources or money to purchase all of the widgets required to 
execute effective EME control. 
4. Strategy 
Strategy is shaped by the objective goals of an organization and how that 
organization historically allocates resources to achieve its objectives.  Joint publications 
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identify the EW strategic task as the “control” of the EME (JP 1-02, 2001, Amended 
2007, p. 177).  American Heritage Dictionary defines control as “exercise[ing] 
authoritative or dominating influence over” (control (n.d.), 2007).  Prior to 1991, 
controlling the EME in military operations was less complicated because of the limited 
variety, quantity, and complexity of information systems as well as the isolation of 
military and civilian information systems.  Additionally, third generation warfare 
delineated between combatants and non-combatants.  The EW strategic task of EME 
control was conceived and has persevered based on these inputs factors.  Derived from 
this strategic task was a strategy based primarily on John Warden’s book The Air 
Campaign (1992): The strategy is three fold.  First, exploit adversary communications to 
determine intentions.  Second, negate a wide geographic area of early warning 
capabilities to detect and report a U.S. military strike.  And third, deny the adversary 
them command and control coordination during military action.   
This strategy is executed in the following way.  EW efforts compliment kinetic 
strikes by electronically decapitating leadership command and control networks from 
early warning communications and the integrated air defense system (IADS).  
Capitalizing on the electronic decapitation of the leadership from information networks, 
precision air strikes using smart bombs systematically attack buildings, tanks, and 
infrastructure to target the will of the people.  Decreasing the will of the people prepared 
the battlefield for U.S. ground troops to secure the land with minimal resistance.  The 
intent was to save lives through air technology.  This strategy was reinforced during the 
Gulf War and again during the twenty-one day combat phase of Operation Iraq Freedom 
in 2003.  Interestingly, this strategy has proven faulty in the remainder of the 
asymmetrical conflicts the U.S. has been involved in since 1991.7  This is the fourth and 
final reason for selecting 1991 to conduct the ORGCON assessment of the command 
level EW.  EW Strategy has not effectively adjusted to the evolution of information  
 
                                                 
7 Operations that the U.S. have been involved in since 1991 include, but are not limited to Haiti, 
Somalia, Allied Force, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and the current 
phase of Operation Iraq Freedom. Please reference the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs website for more information (as accessed on October 25, 2007): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_military_history_events#1991-1999. 
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technology and warfare.  Present conflicts require non-kinetic based precision strikes 
against a localized individual, radio, phone, or computer.  This adaptation failure also is 
seen in the DoD EW resource allocation strategy. 
As mentioned earlier, EW resource allocation is primarily military service branch 
based.  Each service branch is responsible to fund and maintain organic EW capabilities 
required to execute operations pertaining to their respective mission.  Since the end of the 
Gulf War, the Air Force, Navy, and to some extent the Marines have assumed the bulk of 
the specialized EW missions.  These services have specific assets that can exploit, attack, 
and protect select systems or portions of the EME.  Tactical organizations that do not 
have the organic capability to execute the EW mission can make a formal staff request 
for a capability (JP 3-13.1, 2007, Ch. IV).  Requests are designed to ask for an effect 
instead of a particular EW system to allow the command staff flexibility to assign assets 
or find new equipment to meet the needs of the requestor.  Strategy issues arise when 
requests are irrational because of the lack of understanding of EW.  This irrationality is 
due to limited understanding of EW capabilities as a byproduct of the access restrictions 
discussed earlier.  The irrationality may also be due to the false premise that U.S. can 
actually achieve the strategic task of EME control. 
RAND Corporation’s Martin Libicki notes in his monograph, “What is 
Information Warfare?” (1995), there are three problems with the strategic task of EME 
control.  First, the strategy is faulty because the EW community is not proportioned 
appropriately.  The strategic impact of a “large portion of the (EW) community being 
focused on RADAR exploitation and countering through jamming; while a small focus is 
placed on communication jamming” (Ch. 5, p. 1) is those developing strategy think one 
dimensionally.  Second, the cryptography focus of breaking codes was easier when the 
information transmitted was analogue.  Libicki (1995) says “digital encryption, bit keys, 
digital signatures, etc. make it very difficult” (Ch. 5, pp. 2-3).  Senior strategist must 
break the analogue paradigm.  Third, Libicki states “in all aspects of EW the supremacy 
will only be local and thus have tactical implications at best” (Ch. 11, p. 2).  With the 
evolution of technology and warfare, achieving EW supremacy at the tactical level is 
suspect.  Libicki (1995) states unequivocally that the strategic task of EW is “self-
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defeating” and unrealistically defined (Ch. 11, pp.2-3).  Again, this strategic debate is not 
the focus of the analysis; however, it does impact the command level EW organizations 
responsible for planning and management of EW.  The impact is addressed in the 
analysis and recommendation chapters.  Strategy is the last of the five inputs used by the 
transformation core to create an output. 
C. TRANSFORMATION CORE 
Input factors from the feedback process, environment, history, resources, and 
strategy are refined into an output in the transformation core.  Placement of the command 
level EW organization into the context of the transformation core component of the 
combined open systems model is organized as follows: task, formal structure, people, and 
then technology.  The rational for this order is DoD publications formalize tasks within 
the defined structure.  People use technology to execute these tasks.  JP 3-13.1, Electronic 
Warfare, is the primary publication used to place the organization into the context of the 
model.  This starts with task identification. 
1. Task 
The task of command level EW organizations is to plan and manage EW 
operations to achieve the DoD directed desired output of EME control.  Even though all 
of the agencies that comprise command level EW organizations are important, the 
JCEWS is the pivotal component that plans and manages EW.  JCEWS are the middle 
organization between the senior staff, which controls the money, and the operators that 
execute the tactical EW mission.  Based on the vision of taking the “EW fight to the 
enemy,” specific tasks of the JCEWS are identified in Joint publications (JP 3-13.1, 2007, 
p. F-2).   
JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare (2007), defines the JCEWS role is to  
engage in the full range of EW functions to include peacetime contingency 
planning, the day to day planning and monitoring of routine theater EW 
activities, and crisis action planning in the run-up to contingencies in 
preparations for EW as part of emergent joint operations.  (p. IV-1) 
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This is accomplished through identification of EW missions and tasks to service or 
functional component commanders in order to facilitate planning of EW resources 
requirements and accomplish pre-coordination measures necessary to deploy and employ 
EW resources in foreign countries (JP 3-13.1, 2007, p. iii-9). 
Over thirty individual tasks, covering all aspects of EW, are formalized in the 
joint publication for JCEWS to accomplish (See Appendix D).  Additionally, chapter four 
provides ten pages of coordination considerations when planning joint operations (JP3-
13.1, 2007, Ch. 4).  Considerations include: inter-service asset and joint restricted 
frequency list (JRFL) coordination; identification of jam control authority (JCA) 
requirements; EW equipment reprogramming procedures; and integration of national 
level assets to include computer network operations (CNO).  Chapter five of the JP piles 
on international coordination requirements to JCEWS tasks (JP 3-13.1, 2007, Ch. 5).   
A majority of the tasks focus on plans to achieve EA affects.  The next 
concentration of tasks is on ES exploitation efforts; and finally, tasks to protect U.S. 
information flow.  Tasks associated with information flow protection are heavily 
weighted to frequency deconfliction instead of full spectrum EP.  Full spectrum EP 
includes physical hardening and security of information systems, use of frequency agile 
systems, and encryption of transmission.  This disproportionate distribution can be 
explained by Libikci’s (1995) observation that a large portion of EW is concerned with 
RADAR exploitation and jamming with the purpose of executing the suppression of 
enemy air defense (SEAD) mission (Ch. 5, p. 1).  The key observation of the JCEWS 
tasks is that they are numerous and cover all aspects of EW. 
JCEWS must accomplish these numerous and diverse tasks over long, medium, 
and short-range planning cycles.  The formalized tasks are specific enough to provide 
guidelines, but broad enough to allow flexibility in mission accomplishment.  However, 
individual interpretations of these tasks can result in the mission not getting accomplished 
appropriately.  Additionally, the numerous and diverse tasks require the individual to be 
extremely knowledgeable on all EW subcomponents and interaction of EW systems.  The 
impact of individual interpretations and required knowledge level is discussed further in  
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the people to task fit analysis.  Formal structure can play a significant role in providing 
knowledge and guidance required by the command level EW staff to accomplish its 
planning and management task.   
2. Formal Structure 
Figure 7 is a graphical depiction of the EW command structure and coordination 
relationships described in the introduction8.  This formal structure discussion is more in-
depth and is separated into four sections: structural divisions; formal relationships; “as-
required” organizations; and required training and rewards. JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare, 
Chapter IV and personal communication with Lyn Berg from the Joint Electronic 
Warfare Center (JEWC) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas are the primary sources for 
this formal structure discussion 
a. Structural Divisions 
Formal structure of the command level EW organization is a hybrid of 
machine and professional bureaucracy.  The organization is separated into divisions and 
uses traditional command and control and highly formalized tasks to execute its mission 
(United States Congress, 1986).  Divisions of the organization are separated in the 
following order: service, bureaucratic command responsibility, geography, and then 
tasks.  The following example is provided to demonstrate the divisions.  Individuals are 
initially divided when they join a particular service.  As a service member, they are 
assigned to a bureaucratic organization in a particular geographic region.   
                                                 




Figure 7.   Joint Structure of the Command Level Electronic Warfare Organization 
(Derived from Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare, 2007) 
The organization can be joint or service exclusive.  Finally, the individual 
is assigned a particular job in the office with designated tasks.  EW associated job tasks 
can be all inclusive or further divided into tasks based on ES, EA, or EP specialties.  
Since the organization is highly formalized, the basic tasks and reporting responsibilities 
are the same in the different geographic regions.  Therefore structure and tasks of 
European region JCEWS is very similar to Pacific region JCEWS. 
b.  Formal Relationships 
The apex of the command EW organization’s formal structure is the 
National Command Authority (NCA), which consist of the U.S. President and Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF).  The SECDEF is responsible for the Department of Defense 
(DoD) that is subdivided into various agencies.  This analysis is focused on the agencies 
that impact the planning and management of EW.  The primary DoD organizations 
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associated with EW are the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Army, Navy and Air 
Force military service branches; and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (See 
Figure 7).   
Two administrative points must be made on this structure.  First, the 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard are administratively separate service departments.  The 
Marine Corps is part of the U.S. Navy, while the Coast Guard is assigned to the 
Department of Transportation.  Therefore, the Marine Corp is included in this DoD 
structure analysis, but the Coast Guard is not.  It is acknowledged Coast Guard EW 
capabilities play a significant role in Homeland defense, but it is not a DoD organization.  
The second point is the DoD structure associated with EW is divided into three areas: 
functional commands of which STRATCOM is responsible for EW; geographic 
combatant commands (COCOMs); and service branch departments.  The three separate 
tiers in Figure 7 depict this division.  STRATCOM, COCOMs, and the service branches 
each contain EW offices within their structure.  STRATCOM and the COCOM’s EW 
office falls under the Information operations (IO) Cell, while the service branch 
departments have drastically different locations for the EW staff (JP 3-13.1, 2007, p. 8-
11).  The coordination between the separate DoD divisions is not mandated and can result 
in a stove-piping of information if not managed correctly.  Each of these divisions play a 
significant role in EW. 
STRATCOMs mission is to execute “strategic operations” and 
“synchronize DoD kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects” (U.S. Strategic Command, 
2007).  The JEWC is the division of STRATCOM responsible for EW planning and 
synchronization.  JCEWS is the pivotal command level EW organization in the DoD 
structure because they are link between the tactical executors and senior staff with 
authority to provide resources for current and projected EW requirements.  Internally, the 
JCEWS must climb four bureaucratic steps to inform the COCOMs of EW problems and 
requirements.  Externally, a spider web of informal relationship must be traversed by 
JCEWS to accomplish their tasks. 
As a U.S. based, title X empowered joint organization, the JEWC has the 
potential to be an effective center node for the EW community’s network of agencies.  It 
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is the largest, permanent manned organization with internal expertise in all aspects of EW 
and the technology to coordinate with all geographically separated EW components.  
Additionally, the O6 (Captain / Colonel) JEWC commander is the highest ranked joint 
staff position with the sole responsibility of planning and management of EW.  Currently, 
the JEWC consists of approximately fifty-one military and civilian personnel with EW 
expertise9 (Berg, 2007).  The JEWCs primary role is reach back support to the COCOM 
EW staff and, to lesser extent, EW training for the war fighters.  JEWC relationships with 
the COCOM and service branch EW organizations are informal.  COCOM EW 
organizations are the most effected by this informality. 
The geographic COCOMs are responsible for strategic long-term, short-
term, and crisis planning.  Additionally they manage personel and equipment to ensure 
tactical operations are effective.  Internally COCOMs staffs are numbered and divided 
into functional mission tasking.  COCOM staffs that coordinate or impact EW are J1, 
which is responsible for personnel; J2- Intelligence; J3- Operations; J5-Plans; and J6-
Frequency Management Office (FMO).  The COCOM Joint Command EW staff 
(JCEWS) is the primary staff responsible for planning and managing EW operations.  
Normally, the JCEWS consists of one to three individuals trained in only EW 
subcomponent mission.  JCEWS are assigned to the IO Cell within the J3-Operations 
staff, where short and medium range planning is executed.  Long range EW planning is 
coordinated the J5-Plans staff.  EW support, attack, and protect responsibilities are 
divided in the COCOM structure into different functional agencies.   
ES exploitation efforts are dual tasked by national agencies and the J2-
Intelligence.  J3-Operations execute the tactical mission, while J2-Intelligence and 
national agencies process the information for strategic, operational, and tactical planning.  
EA is coordinated within J3-Operations between the IO and Effects cells.  EA is also 
deconflicted with J5-Plans and J6 FMO.  EP is divided across multiple agencies, but not 
                                                 
9 The JEWC was established in 1980 by the Secretary of Defense and reported directly to the JCS.  In 
1994, reporting changed to the U.S. Atlantic command.  By 2006, the JEWC became bureaucratically 
layered under the Joint IO Warfare Command (JIOWC) and STRATCOM.  Another interesting historical 
note that substantiates the chronological division in 1991 is that in the late 1980s, the JEWC consisted of 
approximately 170 personnel.  This has decreased since the end of the Gulf War to the present number of 
51 (Lyn Berg, 2007). 
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managed by one.  J6-FMO manages the spectrum to prevent electronic fratricide; force 
protection agencies harden systems and equipment; Computer Network Operations 
(CNO) branch of J3-Operations defends the network; and various support agencies 
accomplish EP related reprogramming efforts (See Appendix D for JCEWS Tasking).  
Implications of this divided structure are discussed in the analysis.   
Another COCOM office related to EW is each military branch service 
department will have at least one EW officer assigned for service specific coordination.  
Again, this office will normally have expertise limited to their individual service 
experience and in only one EW subcomponent.  The COCOM service branch EW is 
different from the departmental service EW. 
Departmental services are organized to manage EW systems and not EW 
missions because their job is to provide trained warriors to execute COCOM missions.  
Composition and organization of service department EW staffs is currently in transition.  
The Air Force is standing-up cyber command and transitioning from separate EW 
officers (EWO) to a combined navigator and EWO trained individual now labeled a 
Combat Systems Officers (CSO).  The Army is re-establishing EW as a military 
occupational specialty (MOS); and the NAVY is downsizing the Electronic Counter 
Measures Officer (ECMO) in preparation for the EF-18G.  The EW related enlisted 
specialties for all of the service departments are spread throughout the services similar to 
the divisional relationships explained in the COCOM section.  Departmental service 
officer and enlisted EW specialties are tied to EW systems.  COCOMs select individual 
service EW systems like an ala carte menu.  Service department EW organizations main 
responsibility is to manage these individual EW systems, which can be challenging in the 
existing DoD structure.   
The relationship between the JEWC, JCEWS, and service department EW 
organizations is informal and confusing.  This confusion is increased when “as-required” 
EW organizations are established. 
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c. ‘As-required’ Organizations 
The NCA has the authority to stand up a Joint Task Force (JTF).  JTFs are 
established to accomplish a specific mission over a short duration in time.  Appointed 
JTF commanders will normally report directly to the JCS and coordinates parallel to the 
geographic COCOM staff.  Composition of the JTF is at the discretion of the appointed 
commander, but will frequently include an EW office.  The COCOM EW staff may 
simultaneously fill the JTF and COCOM staff position.  If a separate JTF EW office is 
created, the command structure within the JTF is roughly equivalent to the COCOM 
structure.  The equivalent structure and parallel relationships is the reason JTF and 
COCOM staffs are combined in Figure 7.  Parallel relations create confusion when EW 
must be prioritized for tasking and assignment.  The JTF staff will be the supported staff 
and have primacy over COCOM, unless otherwise directed, when this “as-required” 
organization is established. 
Another “as-required” organization identified in JP 3-13.1, Electronic 
Warfare is the EWCC.  When JCEWS recognize a contingency requires a more robust 
EW staff they  
may request that the JFC standup a joint EWCC [Electronic Warfare 
Coordination Cell].  The designated joint EWCC would request additional 
augmentation from other JFC components to form a representative and 
responsive EW planning and execution organization.  (JP 3-13.1, 2007, p. 
IV-1. 
Figure 7 depicts the structural relationships when an EWCC is established.  Establishing 
an EWCC is both bad and good.  Bad, because it adds another formal bureaucratic layer 
and it creates more informal coordination between agencies, which can be confusing.  
Establishing an EWCC is good because the EWCC gives the JCEWS a more robust and 
specialized staff, flexibility to manage EW tasks.  Effectiveness of these “as-required” 
organizations is impacted by training of the individuals. 
d. Required Training and Rewards 
The formal structure required training and rewards associated with 
command level EW organizations are ambiguous.  Required training to fill one of the 
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staff positions in a command level EW organization is associated with the unit or joint 
manning document (UMD/JMD).  The UMD/JMD identifies specific service 
occupational specialty codes and rank to fill the staff positions.  Some UMD/JMD 
positions also mandate training and experience requirements.  Individuals are initially 
assigned military occupational specialty codes after successfully accomplishing 
professional service branch required training in a specific EW subcomponent mission.  
Individual training and not the specialty codes mark the distinction between the personnel 
experienced in the three EW subcomponents.  An example is the Air Force has a 
specialty code for Electronic Warfare Officers; however, these officers receive training to 
specialize in the EA or the ES mission (Berg, 2007).  Individuals learn some aspects of 
the other EW components, but their primary expertise is in one.  Additional training in 
other EW missions and components is not mandatory.   
As mentioned above, the UMD/JMD designates a particular rank for each 
command level EW organizational key staff positions.  The JEWC is commanded by a 
service rank equivalent of an O6 (See Table 2 for U.S. military officer service branch 
rank equivalent chart).  A majority of the JCEWS, departmental service staff EW offices, 
and any EWCCs established are commanded by O5 rank equivalents, while JTFs are led 
by O4, or sometimes O3 rank equivalents.   
 
 
Table 2.   U.S. Military Officer Service Branch Rank Equivalent Chart 
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The command level EW rank structure creates a rank inequality when trying to promote 
EW requirements to senior staff.  Promotion of EW to senior staff is a necessity for 
effective long term EW planning and management.  This inequality is discussed later in 
the analysis section.  Promotion is also impacted by the military structure of the reward 
system. 
Rewards associated with command level EW structure in this discussion 
involve the acquisition of systems and the military promotion and assignment system.  
Increased money allotment for EW programs is the ultimate reward in the bureaucratic 
system.  EW organizations are tied to the bureaucratic budget process, which is extremely 
centralized.  Tactically decentralized EW requirements are requested through the three 
bureaucratic tiers of the DoD structure.  Command level EW organizations must justify 
programs and requirements in the fiercely competitive, yearly, budget cycle.  Programs 
that achieve success or demonstrate sever deficiencies are rewarded with money.  Since 
the service branches maintain individual EW systems, inter-service rivalries over money 
make yearly and long term budgets a vicious process tainted with biased information10.  
However, the budget cycle is a necessary requirement in a large bureaucratic structure.  
This process makes the U.S. vulnerable because they must make trade-offs between cost 
and capabilities.  Fourth generation adversary’s exploit this vulnerability because they 
operate independent of budgeting constraints.  
The final formal structure component to discuss is narrowly focused 
portion of the military promotion and assignment system related to EW.  The U.S. 
military and assignment system is developed on career broadening principles.  Promotion 
eligibility is dependent on the accomplishment of Professional Military Education (PME) 
commensurate with rank.  PME objectives are to provide military members with a broad 
knowledge of service specific history, organizational relationships, and operational 
planning and budgeting cycles.  Promotion is based on successful completion of PME 
and demonstrating career progression.  The military culture for progression requires 
individuals to be moved approximately every three years.  Each physical move is called a 
                                                 
10 For more information on the budgeting process reference retrieved October 25, 2007 retrieved from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/budgphase.htm. 
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Permanent Change of Station (PCS).  During each three-year assignment, individuals that 
perform well are moved into positions with more responsibility.  After ten to twelve years 
of service, individuals are normally PCS’d from tactical jobs to command level 
assignments.  Service branch assignment staffs fill command positions based on the ‘best 
available’ people pool and not the best qualified.  Unlike the corporate world where a 
company boss may hire whatever candidate they want, the government uses a third party 
(i.e. the assignment staff) to assign individuals to fill positions (Schirmer, Thie, Harrell, 
& Tseng, 2006).  Military assignment personnel are restricted to selecting individuals 
designated as ‘eligible to move’ instead of the best qualified.  The expertise and 
continuity of individuals assigned to staff fluctuates because of forced frequent moves 
and “best available” assignment process.  Command level EW organizational success is 
directly related to a person’s individual ability and motivation.   
3. People 
Joint publications do not specifically identify type and level of expertise required 
to effectively manage and plan EW operations at the command level.  These specifics are 
found in the JMD and individual service manpower documents. Chapter II of JP 3-13.1 
Electronic Warfare (2007) identifies the bureaucratic structures of EW.  It also subtlety 
implies EW staff personnel should be trained and experienced in airborne EW.  EW staff 
mandatory training requirements are limited, not standardized across service branches, 
and do not ensure education in all three EW subcomponents.  The result of EW training 
not being mandatory, standardized, and comprehensive is ‘best available’ individuals 
meeting the rank requirements can fill key staff positions following a two week basic EW 
course.  Rick Atkinson’s (2007) Washington Post article “If you do not go after the 
Network, You’re Never Going to Stop these guys.  Never!” illustrates this point: in 2006, 
the “Navy sent submariner, engineers, aviators, etcetera, through a two week EW course 
at Whidbey Island to assist in C-RCIED efforts.”  Even though these individuals had an 
immediate impact, it is not along term solution for EW issues.  Atkinson (2007) equated 
the EW related C-RCIED problems in Iraq to “short comings in EW expertise, especially 
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in Marines and Army.”11  Limited EW expertise is not limited to the Marines and Army.  
The Navy’s two-week EW program is a band-aid solution for the limited number of 
qualified military EW specialists.  A two-week course cannot educate individuals enough 
to understand all tasks required to effectively manage, plan, and employ EW.   
Excluding the band-aid EW positions, the average person filling a command level 
Joint EW positions has a primary level EW education and an average of ten years tactical 
experience.  Primary level EW education is defined as the service specific initial 
occupation qualification schools.  This primary level of education provides an 
introductory level of information on the three subcomponents of EW; integration of EW 
systems; individual service capabilities; and minimal exposure to the latest technology.  
The result of ten years of tactical experience without graduate level or continuing 
education is cognitive biases towards the individuals EW specialty training.  Acquiring 
advanced level or graduate level EW training required to effectively manage and plan 
EW, is left to individual intrinsic motivation (Berg, 2007).   
A second order effect of the technological evolution discussed earlier is the 
exposure of the mass populace to new information technology.  Generations that have 
grown up during the evolution have a greater level of knowledge, understanding, and 
implications of information technology.  Additionally, exposure has decreased the overall 
fear of people to use and understand new technologies.  Over the last few years, 
information technological experienced generations are starting to be assigned to 
command EW organizations middle and senior management levels.  The generation 
running the command level EW senior staff grew up prior to the integration of computers 
and cell phones into everyday life.  The unfamiliarity of senior staff with these systems 
can lead to hesitant use and fear of change.  Generational differences on command staffs 
                                                 
11 The author disagrees with Atkinson’s assessment that about the Marines EW short comings based 
on personal experience and understanding of the formalized structure of the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTAF).  The MAGTAF has a permanent EW cell fully integrated into operations.  It is the author’s 
assessment that the Marines are the most advanced in integrating EW into tactical situations as well as 
planning and managing EW operations within regional conflicts.    Atkinson incorrectly generalized the 
problems in training the average Marine on using the new C-RCIED equipment into all EW.  This 
confusion is a result of limited education and understanding of military EW because of the secrecy of EW 
and its capabilities. 
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create tension and an internal hostile environment.  Slowly this hostility is waning as 
technology is mainstreamed and generational shifts occur in senior leadership positions.   
The benefit of mainstream exposure to information technology is an increase in 
the general population’s knowledge level of basic EME principles.  However, this 
increase does not equate to formal graduate level EW training.  New technologies and 
applications of these technologies that impact EW continue to modify rapidly.  
Adversaries take advantage of the rapid modifications as seen in the Iraq, where the 
insurgents modify RCIED techniques approximately every two to six months (Pengelley, 
2005).  Mandatory formalized continued education is required to keep pace with the 
information and changes.  Increased information technology general knowledge does 
improve management and planning of EW.  Command level EW organizations use the 
new technology to expedite coordination and accomplish the tasks.  Technology is the 
last component of the transformation core. 
4. Technology 
Technology in the transformational core is not the actual widgets used to execute 
tactical EW missions.  Instead, it is the technology used to coordinate the management 
and planning of EW by command level EW organizations.  Joint publications or 
regulations do not designate specific use of technology systems to execute tasks.  
Command level EW tasks include a multitude of coordination items identified in Chapter 
IV of JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare (2007).  These coordination efforts require 
communication across offices, agencies, services, countries and continents.  
Classification restrictions and sensitivity of information require the coordination to occur 
via secured and unsecured channels.  The elevated technological knowledge base of 
command level EW personnel facilitates use of a wide variety of information technology 
to accomplish the mission.  Technology used to coordinate, plan, and manage EW 
includes: traditional postal and express mail; phones calls, conferences, internet, 
electronic mail, electronic chat rooms, websites, and video-teleconferencing.  
Additionally, management and tracking of physical systems, capabilities, and information 
is accomplished both manually and through computers.  The integration of electronic and 
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traditional human processes has created an extensive network of information and support.  
This has been especially beneficial to provide tactical operator’s direct access or “reach 
back” to home station experts on EW.  Effective use of the technology to plan and 
manage has impacted the culture of command level EW organizations. 
D.  CULTURE 
Culture is not a main component of the combined open systems model, but it does 
play a significant role within the organization.  Unlike most aspects of the DoD, the 
organizations culture is not written down in publications or specified in regulations.  
Culture is created by actions taken to follow the regulations or execute the mission.  
Some aspects of the culture in which command level EW organizations operate have 
already been discussed.  These aspects include the relatively small and exclusive EW 
community with classified restricted access, inter-service rivalries, and the predominance 
of an air centric technology focus when planning and managing EW systems.  This 
culture section focuses on the DoD organization as a whole and its adversity to change. 
In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act.  The act established the 
National Security Council (NSC), developed the Department of Defense to include the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff organizational structure, and established the U.S. Air Force as the 
third service branch (United States Congress, 1947).  The intentions of this act were to 
establish a streamlined force that would be responsive to future U.S. military and 
minimize incompatibility issues and internal service self-interest struggles.  The 
intentions were admirable, but the execution was poo.  Divided loyalties, distrust between 
agencies, and heavy a Navy influence within the JCS, left the JCS as a weak office 
compared to the powerful individual services branches (Zegart, 1999, pp. 109, 127, 149).  
Over the next forty years, the inter-service rivalry and weak JCS led to ‘status-quo’ 
dominated culture.  Service branches guarded information and kept projects classified to 
make sure they would never lose money or level of importance.  They entrenched 
themselves along system projects and budget lines creating a hostile environment.  
Service equipment became distinct and incompatible.  The DoD culture was scarred by a 
fear of change and reflected a stagnant strategic organization.  Ultimately these culture 
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created issues contributed to the failed rescue of the Iranian Hostages and Grenada 
operations in the early eighties (Parlier, 1989).  The U.S. Congress tried to correct the 
problems of inter-service rivalries, equipment incompatibility, and weak JCS with the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986; however, the cultural aversion to change 
preserved (Parlier, 1989).   
DoD’s entrenchment culture and aversion to change is explained by Les Aspin.  
In 1975 Les Aspin, the future secretary of defense and initiator of the 1994 DoD spending 
“bottoms-up review” said “when it comes to national security matters, there is a tendency 
to ‘play it safe.’  Playing it safe usually means buying more” (Zegart, 1999, p. 159).  
Buying more does not equal success or progress.  Command level EW organizations 
struggle against this aversion to change culture and the culture created by the air-centric 
dominated strategy.  The structure is designed to purchase lots of technological based 
advanced systems; however these systems attack, exploit or protect against legacy EW 
systems and threats.  Though there are many efforts DoD wide to identify future EW 
threats and counters, the bulk of the planning and management of EW systems remain air 
centric focused. 
A possible explanation for stagnant culture is the generational differences 
between the senior staff and the rest of the EW staff.  Generations less familiar with 
implications of new technology on EW efforts may promote the historic air-centric 
strategy.  In effect, they influence budget and system acquisition efforts to areas where 
they feel comfortable because of cognitive biases.  An example of the cultural impact of 
generational differences is the highly publicized acquisition of the EA-18 Growler 
(Gershanoff, 2002).  The Growler will replace the EA-6B as the only dedicated EA escort 
capable aircraft.  It will be effective in its national security mission of nation state air 
defense suppression; however, it does not help much in the fourth generation conflicts the 
U.S. has been predominately conducting since 1991.  Efforts to manage and plan EW 
systems to counter communication COTS technology used extensively by fourth 
generation warfare adversaries are marginalized in the bureaucratic system until lives are 
lost.  Recently, the air centric strategy and U.S. military culture of “play it safe by buying 
more” was exposed by the counter RCIED efforts in OIF/OEF.  The combination of 
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minimal understating of EW principles and poor management of systems to counter 
COTS technology in an urban environment resulted in the DoD flooding soldiers with 
various types and quantities of EW systems.  Many feel the C-RCIED systems have 
created almost as many, if not more problems then they solved (Fulghum, 2005 and Pitts, 
April 24, 2007). 
DoD’s cultural aversion to change, inter-service rivalries, and stagnant air centric 
strategy impacts EW planning and management by command level EW organizations.  
This has led to a growing gap between U.S. military EW requirements and capabilities.  
This analysis will now investigate the congruence between the transformational core 
components to identify why this culture perseveres and the gap continues to increase in 
the twenty first century. 
E.  CONTEXT SUMMARY 
Placing the command level EW discipline into the context of the combined open 
systems model has been extensive because outside influences and tactical level execution 
affect EW planning and management.  These factors had to be addressed in-depth to 
better understand the following fit analysis.   
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IV. JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and 
conflicting information. 
- Sir Winston Churchill 
A.  SETTING THE ANALYSIS STAGE 
This chapter begins with a short discussion on indicators an organization should 
consider restructuring and identifies some characteristics of troubled organizations.  The 
frequency of these indicators and characteristics revealed in the analysis are used to 
determine if restructuring is required.  Following this discussion is the analysis.  The 
analysis is divided into three sections.  The first section is the combined open systems 
model fit assessment.  The second section provides the results from Burton and Obel’s 
(1998) ORGCON analysis for two periods in history.  The third section combines results 
of both analytical methods.  Implications of these collective results are discussed in the 
final chapter. 
Organizational consultants Bolman and Deal identify pressures that lead an 
organization to consider restructuring.  These pressures are environmental shifts, 
technology changes, organizational growth, and leadership changes (Bolman & Deal, 
2003, p. 84-85).  A determination is made on the need for restructuring based on the 
presence of these pressures and an assessment of the organization’s state.  The state of an 
organization can be successful or troubled.   
Bolman and Deal (2003) provide descriptions of configurations of troubled firms 
that were originally identified by Miller and Friesen.  Two of their configurations 
“stagnant bureaucracies” and “headless giants” are predominant in the analysis.  A 
stagnant bureaucracy is characterized as an “older, tradition dominated organization with 
an obsolete product line and top management [that] is slavishly committed to old ways” 
(Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 84).  A headless giant is described as “a loosely coupled, 
divisional organization that has turned into a feudal barony with a weak administrative 
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core making reactive or crisis-oriented decisions; while initiative and power resides in 
autonomous divisions, that compete for resources” (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 84-85).  
Organizations that do not demonstrate characteristics of a troubled state are considered 
successful.  The presence of these indicators and characteristics exposed by the following 
fit analysis suggest the organization should consider restructuring. 
B. COMBINED OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL BASED FIT ANALYSIS 
The combined open systems model fit analysis of command level EW 
organizations is used to assess the relationships between the four transformation core 
components.  Contextual information from Chapter III is used to conduct the fit 
assessment.  Table 3 is a fit-issue assessment chart that summarizes the results of the 
present study.  The discussion follows the order of this chart.  
 
 
Table 3.   Command Level EW Organizations “Fit-Issue” Assessment Chart (Adapted 
from Nadler and Tushman, 1998, p. 9) 
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1. Task – Organization 
Fit issues between the task and formal organizational structure expose the 
characteristics of a stagnant bureaucracy and headless giant.  Stagnation is first seen with 
the persistent assignment of the counter-productive strategic task of EME control.  
Changes to this task are discussed further in the final chapter; however, this faulty 
strategic task affects the multitude of tasks assigned to formal command level EW 
organizations.   
If one were to summarize the ten plus pages of tasks assigned to command level 
EW organizations into one sentence, it would be “Planning and management of U.S. 
military EW programs and personnel to effectively control the electromagnetic spectrum 
in a dynamic environment.”  Command level EW organizations must manipulate the 
DoD bureaucratic system to ensure that tactical level operators have the resources they 
need to execute operations.  A majority of the responsibilities for these tasks are assigned 
to the COCOM JCEWS.  The tasks are based on the air-centric, SEAD focused, 
technology-driven, third generation of warfare strategy discussed earlier.  The JCEWS is 
the pivotal, bureaucratic organization between tactical operators and senior staff.  DoD’s 
hybrid professional-machine bureaucracy has significantly impeded the ability of 
command level EW organizations to execute their tasks in a dynamic environment.   
The DoD structure in Figure 7 separates the key components of command level 
EW organizations into three tiers.  The JEWC controlled by STRACOM is one tier.  The 
geographic COCOM JCEWs are a second tier, and the individual service branch EW 
staffs are the third tier.  These EW organizations are assigned to separate chains of 
command.  When established, JTF EW positions usually are separate from COCOM EW 
staff.  EW authority is divided between the individual service branches, JCEWS’s, and 
the JEWC tiers.  Relationships between these segregated organizations are informal and 
subject to changes in expertise when people rotate through assignments.  The few formal 
relationships that do exist are impeded by bureaucratic layering and inter service rivalries 
that restrict the organizations adaptability.   
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Amy Zegart (1999) claims that the horizontal and vertical segregation of 
organizations, revealed in Figure 7, was purposely built into the DoD structure to “ensure 
each service has equal play and it [the divisions] provides money for legislatures because 
a decentralized, inefficient military meant more defense spending” (p. 154).  Command 
level EW organizations are externally divided along geographic boundaries and 
bureaucratic responsibilities.  Internally, they also are divided into the EW sub-missions 
of ES, EA, and EP.  The multiple divisions have resulted in a structure with restricted 
relationships and repetitive capabilities.  Minimal formal connections between divided 
components impede organizational coordination and adaptability.  Congressional 
opposition to military centralization exists because multiple divisions and repetitive 
capabilities of the military weaken the authority of military leadership and spreads project 
money across congressional districts.  Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, during 
coordination for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichol’s Act (GNA) adds, “historically, Congress 
has been a foe of centralized leadership of the military branches” (Zegart, 1999, p. 155).   
Designing the organization with a segregated structure and redundant processes 
leads to resource competition.  This competition fosters an internal hostile environment 
that creates a stove-piped functional culture.  This stove-piped structure contradicts the 
recommendations made by DoD advisor, Dr. John Arquilla.  Arquilla (2001) argues that 
an integrated coordination and communication network structure is required for success 
in twenty-first century military operations (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, United States, Dept. of 
Defense, & Office of the Secretary of Defense).  Many of these operations are identified 
as conflicts and not declared wars. 
Except for Allied Force in 1998 and the first stage of the Gulf War in 2003, 
operations involving the U.S. military following the 1991 Gulf War were considered 
conflicts and not wars (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
2007).  Since the 1986 GNA, operations declared as wars have achieved tactical success 
because they exceeded the bureaucratic noise threshold. The noise threshold is the 
combined goals and tasks executed by bureucracies on a regular basis.  Conflicts have not 
experienced the same level of success.  Because bureaucracies  are inundated with issues 
and internal agendas, military “conflicts do not take automatic primacy over other goals 
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pursued by factions within the government” (Mack, 1975, p. 184).  Command level EW 
organizations struggle to elevate primacy of tasks above the noise threshold in operations 
identified as conflicts.   
JCEWS are buried under three bureaucratic levels within COCOM staffs.  They 
also do not have a robust organic EW capability.  Formalized requirements restrict direct 
access to other EW organizations and force JCEWS to take laborious steps to request EW 
assistance.  The lack of direct formal coordination and the fact that EW authority is 
divided has resulted in weakened staff positions and the stove-piping of resources, which 
are characteristic of a headless giant.  The effect of the combination of conflicts operating 
below the bureaucratic noise threshold and the headless giant phenomenon is illustrated 
by the U.S. led efforts to counter terrorist use of RCIED’s.  Initial efforts were divided 
between Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.  Complications with mission execution did not 
break the noise threshold until many lives were lost.  A Pentagon official, commenting on 
the EW issues with the CRCIED campaign, exclaimed, “no one realized how much 
tougher jamming was going to be in the ground plane” (Atkinson, 2007).  The real 
problem is not a lack of understanding of jamming in the ground plane, but the lack of a 
sufficient structure to give the experts an authoritative, centralized voice.   
Another task-organization fit issue is seen in the manning of command level EW 
positions and the affect on task coordination.  JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, Chapter II, 
“Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare” is riddled with the terms “may” and “should” 
when describing command relationships and establishing “as-required” organizations (p. 
II-2).  Creation of these ad-hoc “as-required” organizations increases the number of 
informal relationships, which affect coordination.  Additionally, the lack of 
standardization for permanent EW organizations affects coordination.  Manning levels 
and composition of personnel at the JEWC, COCOM JCEWS’s, and service branch EW 
staffs are not standardized.  In fact, the configuration of the JCEWS is at the discretion of 
the commander.  This means the JCEWS can consist of one person, an ad-hoc team or a 
full staff to include an EWCC.  As a single entity or a full staff, the JCEWS must divide 
their attention to manage ES, EA, and EP, while simultaneously coordinating EW with 
the J2, J3, J5, and J6 offices.  JCEWS require cross agency coordination to be effective. 
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Coordination across agencies is handicapped because EW positions lack sufficient 
command authority.  Even though the JCEWS and any ‘as-required’ JTF EWs 
established are the most central to EW issues, they lack the rank and associated authority 
(normally an O4 rank equivalent) to coordinate formally outside the EW community.  
EW expertise and authority that can assist with JCEWS EW issues is centralized at the 
JEWC (commanded by O6 rank equivalent).  However, coordination is restricted because 
the JEWC is under a separate chain of command.  Command level EW organizations 
responsibilities are large, but they lack the authority level to be effective in a stove-piped 
organizational structure.  Requests for assistance and coordination are another task-
formal structure misfit. 
JCEWS and/or JTF EWs coordinate a majority of the requests to acquire EW 
capabilities because they connect the tactical operators and the senior level staff.  JCEWS 
or JTFs have multiple avenues to coordinate requests.  They can initiate requests through 
the COCOM or JTF general staff formal chain of command.  They also can go directly to 
the individual service branches for assistance.  A final option is to coordinate with the 
JEWC in an attempt to elevate the priority of the request in the joint system.  Even 
though this coordination process provides multiple ways to circumnavigate the 
bureaucratic system; it is a confusing matrix that is redundant, time consuming, and 
subject to inter-service rivalries.  DoD’s acquisition process, which matches requests to 
requirements, contributes to task-structure fit issues. 
The military acquisition process is service branch driven.  The process can take up 
to twenty years to deliver a capability requested to counter a specific threat system 
(Griffard, 2002).  In twenty years, a minimum of four people typically have rotated 
through staff positions and up to ten different modifications could have been made to that 
threat system12.  In addition to the normal acquisition process being slow and 
maladaptive, it is also degenerate.  The stagnant strategy and divided structure are the 
reasons for this erosion.  The U.S. Navy’s recent acquisition of the EA-18 Growler is a 
contentious program that highlights the degenerate nature of acquisition process.   
                                                 
12 This is based on the normal three to four year PCS cycle for staff officers and the two-year 
technology update cycle discussed in Chapter III. 
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The Growler is the replacement for the aging EA-6B Prowler flown by both the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  These aircraft are the U.S. military’s primary RADAR jammer 
and only strike-escort capable EA aircraft.  The Navy acquired the aircraft, but did not 
purchase any for the Marine Corps (Gershanoff, 2002).  The Navy controls the Marine 
budget, which is a trump card in the DoD acquisition process.  Arguably, the mission of 
the Marines, as a land based expeditionary task force, warrants this type of organic 
capability in the twenty-first century more than the Navy.  The Navy does provide 
Marines transport to conflicts.  Also Naval aircraft carriers globally project sea power; 
however, a majority of the conflicts since 1991 have required EW air assets to operate 
beyond the limits of Naval sea power projection.  Currently, U.S. Marine Prowlers 
execute specific EA missions beyond naval sea power.  In the future, their will be a void 
in this area.  Availability and reliability of Marine assets will decline as the Navy phases 
the EA-6B from the inventory.  The decrease in availability will fuel inter-service 
rivalries as agencies compete for limited EW assets. 
Airborne EW is described as Low Density-High Demand (LDHD) assets because 
they are requested often, but have limited availability.  The Navy plan to replace EA-6Bs 
with less EA-18s further decreases the density, but does not decrease the demand.  This 
disparity increases inter-service rivalries.  Tactically, U.S. Marines and Army troops that 
require EA-18 support are forced to fight over limited assets availability.  Rivalries also 
are intensified when COCOMs request carrier based naval EW assets be re-assigned to 
forward deployed land bases beyond sea power projection.  Historically, U.S. Navy 
carrier designated aircraft are rarely administratively assigned to COCOM land based 
units.  These task-structure fit issues are also present in the rapid acquisition process.   
In the rapid acquisition cycle, procurement and distribution of EW systems is 
accomplished through intra-service acquisition programs.  This means the Army 
purchases equipment for the Army, the Air Force for the Air Force, etcetera.  This system 
results in redundancy and interoperability issues.  Rear Admiral Macy, commented that 
“part service rivalry, part delivery schedules, and partly the systems could not be made 
fast enough” contributed to the issues with the acquisition of Counter RCIED Electronic 
Warfare (CREW) systems used in OIF/OEF (Atkinson, 2007).  Thirty variations and 
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10,000 individual pieces of equipment comprised the CREW systems that were acquired.  
These systems were fielded to ground forces with minimal training.  The JTF EW 
responsible to deconflict the EW system was not initially integrated into the acquisition 
and fielding of the CREW systems.  CREW systems deconfliction problems and 
interoperability failures resulted in electronic fratricide and unnecessary deaths 
(Atkinson, 2007).  After the JTF-EW became aware of the issues, corrections were 
delayed because the position lacked authority to initiate changes.  It took almost two 
years for the one-man JTF EW office within the IO cell in Iraq to convince the leadership 
to stand up and appropriately staff an EWCC.13  The establishment of the EWCC and the 
mandate by the JTF commander to centralize and standardize the acquisition of joint 
CREW systems were pivotal steps employed to mitigate the EM mess created by these 
unmanaged systems.  Incidents of electronic fratricide are likely to increase as units use 
discretionary funds to purchase cheaper, better electronics in a timely manner.  The 
informal acquisition structure created by direct purchase of EW systems is counter to 
research describing organizations that effectively adapt to dynamic environments. 
Organizational consultants Schoonhoven and Jelinek (1990), found that high 
technology organizations that do adjust effectively to dynamic environments use: 
clear organizational structures, frequent reorganizations, and quasi-
structures that contributes significantly to long term innovative abilities.  
Additionally, the organizations employees understood the process for 
innovation and the formal chain of command relationships and how the 
quasi structures worked. (p. 117) 
The technology used by command level EW organizations to coordinate does not make 
them a high technology organization; however, the high technological dynamic 
environment in which they operate does.  A confusing, stove-piped formal command 
structure, segregated by inter-service rivalries, and minimized by weak authority in rank 
match the stagnant bureaucracy and headless giant characteristics.  The fit issues between 
                                                 
13 The author was deployed as an aircraft liaison working with the one man JTF-7 EW staff within the 
IO cell in Baghdad.  JTF-7 was later designated Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) in May 2004.  The 
efforts to stand up an EWCC began in April of 2004, but was not formally stood-up until the summer of 
2005.  In the spring of 2006, the EWCC at MNC-I was appropriately staffed. 
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the command level EW organizational structure and tasks overshadow the remainder of 
the combined open systems model fit analysis. 
2. Task – People 
EW tasks include EP efforts to protect computers and information networks, ES 
collection of information to be analyzed by intelligence, and EA mission’s intent on 
denying adversaries ability to get information.  Misfits between these tasks and people 
assigned to accomplish these tasks are a result of training, education, personnel 
ambitions, and to some extent access restrictions. 
Training in EW tasks is not standardized internally to service branches or 
externally across services or EW missions.  People assigned to command level EW 
organizations have different training requirements and experiences.  The differences 
reflect qualification requirements for service branch programs.  The resultant fit issue is 
that people assigned to command level EW are not trained in all the tasks.   
As mentioned earlier, the unit or joint manning document (UMD/JMD) matches 
staff job requirements to military occupational specialty codes.  Individuals earn a 
specialty code after service required initial training programs are completed.  Individual 
experiences from conducting EW missions complement initial training.  A large majority 
of the command level EW positions are coded for air trained EW positions because of the 
historical focus of the air-centric EW strategy.   
Currently, the 563rd Flying Training Squadron, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 
provide initial joint undergraduate EW training to Air Force, Navy, and Marine aviators 
selected to be EW officers (Global Security.org, 2005).  This aviator joint undergraduate 
EW training appropriately covers broad EW concepts and is air-centric focused.  After 
graduation, EW aviators attend aircraft specific training before earning their service 
specific military occupational specialty codes.  Beyond this mandated basic EW course, 
the advanced training and experiences vary greatly among the service EW aviators.  AF 




very different experiences than Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) trained to execute EA-6B 
EA missions.  Additionally, EA trained EWOs are different from EWOs trained in the 
RC-135 ES mission.   
In addition to aviators, each service has additional specialty codes that execute 
various EW related missions.  Personnel assigned to these codes have their own training 
and experiences.  Naval surface and subsurface, Army signal intelligence, Marine Radio 
Battalions, and force protection personnel all execute EW operations; however, they do 
not attend the Joint EW School in Texas.  Conversely, the aviators do not attend the 
undergraduate level training for these EW related career fields.  The isolated and 
divisional structure prevent standardized undergraduate level training.  Graduate level 
EW training can close the gap between required EW task knowledge and individual EW 
knowledge.  
Graduate level EW training is available; however, training is not mandated by 
service branches, standardized across them or accredited.14  Attendance is subject to 
individual ambition and service funding (Berg, 2007).  Course accreditation would ensure 
that command level EW required planning and management tasks are taught.  Rank based 
Professional Military Education (PME) series is the only mandated training for military 
personnel.  PME series focus on broad joint operational concepts, DoD planning and 
budget processes, military history, and service branch organizational structures.  
Standardized and mandated training deficiencies result in the misfit between extensive 
required EW task knowledge and personnel with limited EW task knowledge.   
People assigned to command level EW organizations bring cognitive biases from 
service branch specific EW training.  Cognitive biases foster task-people fit issues 
because people accomplish familiar tasks and tend to avoid unfamiliar tasks.  On the job 
training (OJT) is required to compensate for EW training deficiencies and cognitive  
 
                                                 
14 The 563rd FTS, JEWC, Joint Forces Staff College and several EW organizations like the 
Association of Old Crows (AOC) provide graduate level EW courses for military and DoD members.  
Attendance is and requires external approval and funding.  Additionally, the USAF Weapons School 
(USAFWS), Naval EW School (NAVEWS), and Marine Corps Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 
(MAWTS) offer graduate level EW training and joint integration employment concepts.  Attendance to 
these courses is based on a highly competitive selection process.   
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biases.  Three to four year PCS requirements equate to task knowledge regression as each 
assigned individual begins a new OJT cycle.  This OJT regression cycle is more severe 
with tasks that involve restricted access classified programs.   
Command level EW staff assigned personnel are required to plan and manage 
classified programs.  Restricted access to classified programs naturally leads to limited 
program knowledge level.  Each PCS results in a regression in program expertise.  Some 
individuals avoid coordinating classified programs because security procedures are 
perceived to be ‘too cumbersome’ or they want to avoid harsh punishments associated 
with program security violations.  In the classified or unclassified realm, command level 
EW assigned personnel must establish trust to be successful. 
Yvonne Lederer-Antonucci, et al.’s (2003) business trust research revealed that, 
“establishing trust is the fundamental requirement for successful business to business 
relationships.”  Trust is established through job performance competency, reliability 
derived integrity, and empathetic benevolence.  Trust based relationships are even more 
important when organizations that make up a team are geographically separated.  
Internally, task competency built trust is necessary for command level EW to overcome 
the three chain of command tiers and four bureaucratic layers within the DoD structure.  
Externally, trust gained by individual competency is required to effectively coordinate all 
the required EW tasks across multiple agencies that are geographically separated.  A 
formalized, accredited graduate level training program could mitigate the task-people 
incongruence created by non-mandated standardized training and constant personnel PCS 
requirements.   
3. Task – Technology 
Task-technology fit issues are minimal when executing short-term tasks; however, 
issues are present during long term planning and management of EW.  Stateside and 
permanent overseas DoD installations have harnessed communication technology 
effectively to manage and plan short term EW operations in all classified realms.  Near 
real time coordination between geographically separated organizations is achieved 
through a combination of secured and unsecured land based, satellite, wireless, and hard 
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wired information systems.  Internet chat protocols, websites, video teleconferencing, 
traditional phone lines, satellite and wireless connections, and personal face-to-face 
meetings are used to manage and plan EW.  Organizations are authorized limited 
discretionary funds to purchase information technology (IT) systems necessary to create 
the network of EW organizations recommended by Arquilla (1997).  Two task-
technology fit issues are related to forward deployed connectivity and mass acquisition of 
information technology systems.   
The requirement to have forward deployed EW organizations is a secondary 
effect of the evolution of fourth generation warfare.  JTF EW staff and other command 
level EW organization that operate outside permanent DoD installations have fewer 
resources and limited IT connectivity.  Availability of the full compliment of secured and 
unsecured IT is based on site protection.  Networked links with remote organizations is 
restricted until physical and electronic protection requirements are met.  Connectivity 
also is limited by mobile bandwidth restrictions.  Command level EW organizations must 
make trade-offs between cost, security, classification, and bandwidth when establishing 
connectivity.  Knowledge of and accessibility to the latest technology is required to 
mitigate trade-off loss.  Recognition and individual authority to purchase IT is the second 
task-technology misfit. 
Knowledge of IT systems is required to recognize applications to EW planning 
and management tasks.  IT education is not mandatory and is left to the ambition of the 
individual.  Organizations can use discretionary funds to purchase limited numbers of 
equipment, however mass acquisition requests compete with other mission requirements.  
Large corporations, like DoD, typically delay acquisition of new systems until they have 
been proven or deemed mission essential.  Harvard Business school professor Clayton 
Christensen explains that hesitation is because large corporations work with sustaining 
technology.   
Large corporations excel at knowing their market, staying close to their 
customers, and having a mechanism in place to develop existing 
technology. Conversely, they have trouble capitalizing on the potential 
efficiencies, cost-savings, or new marketing opportunities created by low-
margin disruptive technologies. (TechTarget, 2006)  
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Christensen uses real world examples to demonstrates how big corporations can 
dismiss the value of disruptive technologies that do not reinforce current company goals.  
Corporations are blindsided when technology matures, gains a larger audience, market 
share, and threatens the business status quo (TechTarget, 2006). 
Command level EW organizations either failed to plan or did not effectively 
elevate long-term plans above the bureaucratic noise threshold in time to counter 
disruptive technology on the battlefield.  The introductory examples of EW deficiencies 
are the result of long-term plan failures.    Based on this research, we can speculate that 
the weak authority structure contributes to this fit issue in command level EW 
organizations.  Hesitation to adapt to disruptive technology and failure to elevate plans 
above the bureaucratic noise threshold due to fragmented and weak command authority 
are characteristics associated with stagnant bureaucracies and headless giants.  Personnel 
that execute command level EW tasks must have the knowledge and authority to monitor, 
identify, acquire, train, and employ new technologies in order to overcome task-
technology fit issues.   
4. Organization – People 
Some misfits between formal organization structure and people have been 
discussed.  These are a fragmented structure, a lack of graduate level, formalized 
education and limited expertise in only one mission of EW.  All of these contribute to 
organization-people fit issues.  Additional organization-people fit issues include the DoD 
assignment process and organizational rank structure. 
Mentioned earlier, the DoD assignment process is based on a three to four year 
PCS transfer cycle.  Functional managers or branch chiefs assign individuals to 
organizations.  Managers identify individuals for assignment to command level EW staff 
based a pool of people available to move within the cycle.  This “best-available” 
assignment process does not guarantee that the best-qualified person is selected.  The 
discrepancy between individual qualifications and required tasks is not corrected by 
formal training.  The DoD assignment cycle results in corporate knowledge and trust 
regression every three to four years.  As command level assigned EW individuals regress 
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to re-establish trust and gain task knowledge, adversarial capabilities and expertise 
increase.  This growth disparity is a potential recipe for disaster.  A 2007 Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) review acknowledges the gravity of this 
incongruence: “the current military personnel management will not meet needs of future 
operating environment” (Schirmer et al., 2006, p. iii).  U.S. command level EW 
organizations will have trouble overcoming stagnation if they have to retrain personnel 
and rebuild internal relationships every three to four years.  Mandated professional 
graduate level training is one way to minimize the OJT regression and develop 
consistency of personnel experiences.  Consistency combined with proficiency equates to 
trust, which is a vital component of successful teams (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 105).   
The combination of bureaucratic layers and weak command authority is the final 
organization-people misfit.  The JEWC commander is the only command level EW staff 
positions above the O5 rank.  The O5 rank is the corporate world equivalent to lower 
senior staff/middle management.  Completion of EW staff tasks requires coordination 
across joint services and with multiple agencies.  The lack of EW staff rank-based 
authority inhibits coordination and task accomplishment.  Issues with EW tasks are 
subject to formal chain of command procedures, which delays mission accomplishment.  
JCEWs are first forced to compete against other core components of IO for the attention 
of the O6 rank equivalent IO cell chief.  If this battle is won, JCEWS must then fight 
through the J3 operations commander and two more layers of bureaucracy before EW 
issues are presented to the COCOM (JP 3-13, 2006, p. IV-5).  This process can be 
lengthy and severely degrade the accomplishment of formalized tasks in a timely manner.  
The fragmented structure also induces delays and degrades task accomplishment.   
Command level EW organizations are divided by geography, chain of command 
responsibilities, and EW subcomponents.  These divisions create many problems.  The 
geographic separation makes it difficult to coordinate, plan, and manage EW.  As the 
only O6, the JEWC commander’s power to assist other command level EW personnel 
with EW issues is marginalized because most EW staff positions are outside the JEWC 
chain of command.  Individual EW expertise and execution of EW sub-mission are 
spread throughout various joint staffs.  Even though JCEWs are responsible for EW, the 
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J2, J6, and J3 staffs accomplish some form of ES, EA, and EP.  EW related information is 
not reported to or coordinated with the JCEWS by these different agencies.  A centralized 
structure with appropriate command authority is required to formulate a comprehensive 
command level EW picture. 
Combined, the fit issues between personnel and the segregated divisional 
structure contributed to the difficulties encountered in OIF.  The JTF EW was unable to 
elevate the counter RCIED issues above the bureaucratic threshold until lives were lost 
(Atkinson, 2007).  The organization-people fit issues associated with training 
deficiencies, rank and authority inequalities, and fractionalized EW structure are 
characteristic of a headless giant and stagnant bureaucracy. 
5. Organization – Technology 
An increase in informal structures is the result of the fit issue between formal 
organization and technology.  Bolman and Deal (2003) state that organizations that 
correctly use information technology have a “flatter, more flexible, and more 
decentralized structure” (p. 59).  Command level EW organizations effectively use IT to 
develop networks and informal structures that circumnavigate bureaucratic inefficiency.  
Development of informal organizations does improve coordination; however, they risk 
fracturing the chain of command (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 64).   
Additionally, the flexible and decentralize informal structure is outside the formal 
planning and acquisition process.  Organizations use IT to link directly and get critical 
information fast, but information is shared only between two connected nodes.  
Command level EW organizations are bypassed or receive inaccurate information 
because of informal relationships.  Missing or inaccurate information results in poor EW 
planning.  EW systems acquired based on bad information will not meet task 
requirements.  The rise of informal structures within EW counters research on 
organizations that effectively adapt to dynamic environments.  Schoonhoven and 
Jelinek’s (1990) identify that formal structures and quasi-formal relationships are 
required for organizations to adapt effectively to dynamic environments.  The 
organization is flexible, but flexibility does not equate to adaptability. 
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6. People – Technology 
People-technology fit in command level EW organizations is congruent.  
Command level EW personnel have effectively employed technology in accomplishing 
their tasks.  Creation of websites like the JEWC reach-back site and E-Space15, secured 
chat rooms, and integration of COTS information systems are important components that 
affect the U.S. information flow.  Use of this technology has created virtual networks 
within the entire EW community and across the U.S. military.  These networks are also 
known as informal organizations.  Fit issues generated by informal organizations have 
been described.  Generation differences in IT use and understanding is the only remaining 
potential fit issue.   
This IT based “generation difference” (discussed in Chapter 3) fit issue 
significantly impacts long term EW plans.  Senior individuals that do not understand the 
importance of technology cannot effectively operate within the bureaucratic program 
acquisition and budget process.  Eventually, the widgets required to employ tactical EW 
are not acquired in a timely manner or, worse, not at all. Generation differences may be 
the reason Clayton Christensen’s observed that large corporations have trouble 
acknowledging and adjusting to disruptive technologies (TechTarget, 2006).  Failure to 
adapt to technologies leads to a failure to plan and manage future EW requirements. 
7. Summary 
The fit analysis of command level EW communities within the context of the 
combined open systems model exposed several fir issues.  Three predominate 
organizational problems were identified: (1) insufficient training; (2) weak command 
authority; and, (3) limited formal coordination due to a divided structure.  These 
organizational fit issues are cumulative and the second and third order effects impede the 
organization’s ability to adapt to dynamic inputs.   
                                                 
15 These websites are just two examples of many websites created to help the U.S. military to 
coordinate EW.  These sites are accessed through secured connections. 
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C. ORGCON EXPERT SYSTEM DIAGNOSTIC FIT ANALYSIS 
Burton and Obel’s (1998) expert system Organizational Consultant (ORGCON) 
software was used as a secondary method to analyze the DoD organizational structure of 
command level EW organizations.  The theory and methodology for the expert system 
ORGCON were discussed in Chapter II.  Appendix E contains the list of ORGCON’s 
questions, authors’ responses, and ORGCON’s fit analysis output with design 
recommendations for both periods. 
Two ORGCON analyses were run to compare the structure and environment of 
command level EW organization as it stood at the end of the 1991 Gulf War and as it 
stands in 2007.  Analysis is separated at the end of the 1991 Gulf War based on the four 
reasons discussed in Chapter III.  Table 4 contains the context of two analyses, in terms 
of some of the structural and environmental distinctions between the two periods.   
 
Table 4.   Command Level EW Organizations Structural Considerations Divided In Two 
Periods. 
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As Table 4 shows, command level EW task requirements and complexity increased 
across the two periods, while the number of people and EW expertise decreased.  
Additionally, EW formal and informal organizations were established and administrative 
restructuring, which moved the JEWC under the IO Cell, created more bureaucratic 
layers.  These contextual distinctions are reflected in the author’s inputs to the ORGCON 
expert system.  Table 5 presents input differences and the rationale for these differences 
between the periods reflective of these contextual changes.  The differences show an 
increase in formalization and control by senior management, a requirement shift from 
mass production to specialized services, and multiple environmental changes.   
 
Table 5.   ORGCON Differences Inputs: Pre and Post 1991 Comparison Rationale  
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Table 6 summarizes the ORGCON analysis for both periods.  Table 6 also 
provides ORGCON assessed structure misfits and the implications of these misfits on 
task completion.  The results of the ORGCON analyses are consistent with the combined 
open systems model assessment that the structure of command level EW organization 
have failed to adapt to the dynamic environment.  The following discussion explains how 
this statement was induced.   
 
 
Table 6.   ORGCON Expert System Analysis Output Describing Command Level EW 
Organizations (Derived from ORGCON Output, Appendix E) 
Overall, ORGCON assessed two organization-task misfits and identified zero 
future recommendations for the command level EW organizational structure between 
1986 and 1991.  This assessment implies that the initial organizational structure (1986-
1991) was compatible with the tasks.  Conversely, ORGCON assessed the current 
structure (1991-2007) as having four organization-task misfits, and it generated seven 
future organization recommendations.  The increase in misfits and recommendations 
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implies that the current structure in which command level EW organizations operate is 
not congruent with the required tasks.  The results are interpreted as indicating that the 
organization has not adapted to the dynamic environment in the twenty-first century.   
Despite the contextual changes, the ORGCON results indicate that senior 
management style, climate, strategy, hostility, and organizational structure were basically 
identical for both periods.  The micro-involvement style of senior management and the 
strategy of analyzer with innovator creates a centralized, information saturated leader and 
a risk-aversion organizational culture.  This management style and strategy combination 
is one possible explanation for the difficulties encountered by command level EW 
organizations trying to get EW issues prioritized above the bureaucratic noise threshold.  
The senior leadership is too involved in daily tasks, they are unable to develop a long 
term strategy.  This preoccupation with daily tasks affects education and understanding of 
new technologies.  The lack of understanding results in a reluctance to integrate new 
technologies into long-term plans until the technology has been proven.   
Long term planning failures can be also attributed to the internal process climate 
created by inter-service rivalries and compartmentalized expertise.  EW organizations 
have to constantly reinforce entrenched positions to defend programs and protect budgets.  
The problem is the entrenched positions are divided by stove-piped command structures.  
This division restricts lateral coordination, which would permit command level EW 
organizations to mutually defend EW interest in the budget process.  Fragmented and pre-
occupied with these battles, they do not recognize the symptoms associated with a need 
to change.  The internal process climate as a result of the structure does not allow 
command level EW organizations the flexibility required to respond to the highly hostile 
environment created by the co-evolution of IT and fourth generation warfare.  Combined, 
these individual indicators revealed a conflicting structural requirement.  
ORGCON assesses the structural requirement to be centralized, yet flexible is a 
misfit.  This misfit is created because the EW tasks require high control of and 
centralized accountability for EW programs and systems.  At the same time, the tasks 
require flexibility to adapt to the changes in the dynamic environment.  This is equivalent 
to the combined open systems model assessment that control and accountability of EW 
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was difficult due to a weak command authority dispersed throughout a fragmented 
structure.  The JEWC represents a potential centralized hub to coordinate EW, but it lacks 
command authority to cross agencies or elevate joint EW issues above the bureaucratic 
noise threshold until lives are lost.  Analysis also reveals the lack of standardized 
experiences and mandated job related professional education decreased the flexibility of 
organizations.  Attempts to be flexible are localized to individual services and units that 
purchased EW and IT systems; however, system interoperability failures at the joint level 
have negated any advantages.  The multiple misfits identified by the collective 
assessment of the combined open systems model and ORGCON analyses lead to a 
number of recommendations for organizational changes. 
D. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The collective assessment of the combined open systems model and ORGCON 
analyses lead to the conclusion that command level EW organizations are stagnant and 
have failed to adapt to the dynamic environment.  It suggests the characteristics of a 
stagnant bureaucracy and headless giant.  Stagnation is a result of limited formal 
coordination, weak command authority, insufficient training, and a fragmented divisional 
structure.  These conclusions are characteristics of a troubled organization that requires 
change.  ORGCON analyses suggests that command level EW organizations change to a 
centralized, but flexible structure.  Restructuring to meet this requirement is difficult, but 
achievable.  The next chapter identifies realistic restructuring recommendations that will 
allow the organizations to adapt effectively to the dynamic environment of the twenty 
first century.   
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As a general rule, the most successful man in life is the man who has the best 
information.  
- Benjamin Disraeli (1800s British Statesmen) 
 
The exploitation inadequacies prior to September 11, 2001; attack problems 
encountered in the C-RCIED campaign; and protection vulnerabilities exposed by 
Chinese hacker intrusions into DoD systems demonstrate symptoms of EW decline.  This 
thesis combined the contingency theory based combined open systems model and Burton 
and Obel’s (1998) ORGCON expert system to draw conclusion about the affect 
command level EW organizations have on the symptoms of EW decline.  The collective 
assessment concluded that the command level EW organization is stagnant and has failed 
to adapt to the dynamic environment.  The stagnate bureaucracy and headless giant 
attributes exposed by the analysis exemplify characteristics of organizations that require 
change (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 58).  Michael Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies 
from the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, when testifying before the 
House Armed Forces committee, acknowledged the necessity for the U.S. to modify the 
composition and hierarchical structure of governmental agencies (Vickers, 2006).  
Reorganizing a component of a large bureaucratic institution responsible for the defense 
and security of the nation is a complex problem requiring an integrated solution.   
The intent of the following discussion and recommendations are to ensure U.S. 
information flow advantage in the twenty-first century.  The intent is not to trivialize the 
efforts of existing organizations or individuals actively engaging in efforts to improve the 
adaptability of command level EW organizations to dynamic environments.  Changes 
start with a change in strategy.  The strategic task of EME control is addressed prior to 
recommending structural changes.   
Burton and Obel (1998) pose the question “does strategy follow structure or does 
structure follow strategy?” (p. 252).  This discussion implies that strategy drives the 
organizations structure.  The historical review and thesis assessment support Libicki’s 
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(1995) declaration that EW is assigned an unachievable, self-defeating strategic task of 
EME control (Ch. 11, p. 2-3).  The 2007 version of JP 3-13.1 states, “The purpose of EW 
is to deny the opponent an actual or perceived advantage in the EM spectrum and ensure 
friendly unimpeded access to the EM spectrum portion of the information environment” 
(p. xii).  This purpose statement is a change from previous EW mission statements and is 
not standardized across joint publications.  The perception of EME control persists with 
the phrases “deny opponent advantage” and “ensure unimpeded access.”  As more 
commercial information systems are developed, acquired, and integrated into the battle 
space, EW supremacy will remain localized and achieve only tactical implications.  
Libicki (1995) suggests the DoD should employ an EW strategy focused on supplying 
and protecting U.S. use of the EME instead of controlling through denial (Ch. 11, p. 2).   
A proposed new strategy is as follows: ‘the purpose of EW is to maintain U.S. 
information flow advantage’.  Controlling implies the ability of the EW community to 
dominate every aspect of the EME.  Conversely, maintaining implies adjustments to the 
dynamic environment in order to keep pace with requirements and achieve the advantage.  
It implies also that system, time, location, and EM spectrum trade-offs are required to 
accomplish the task.  Strategic priorities are opposite of the current strategy.  The 
priorities would be to first, protect information; second, exploit adversary information; 
and third, attack adversary information flow with precise electronic fires.  Efforts to 
change the structure of command level EW organizations may be fruitless if the driving 
strategy is not appropriately modified. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The collective assessment of the combined open systems model and ORGCON 
identified command level EW organizations require centralization, yet flexibility.  
Currently the structure is fragmented and operates with weak authority that is buried 
under bureaucratic layers, and the organization lacks a formalized graduate level training 
program.  One course of action (COA) to correct these problems is to establish a formal 
centralized EW structure.  The JEWC would be the center coordination node of the 
structure that is networked to professionally educated EW nodes.  The JEWC would be 
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the central, but not primary, agency responsible for command level planning and 
management of EW.  The geographically separated combatant JCEWS and Joint Task 
Force EW positions would coordinate planning and management functions through the 
centralized JEWC hub.  This course of action (COA) would require a total reorganization 
of U.S. DoD EW organizations and create chain of command authority issues that would 
degrade COCOM combat operations.  Additionally, the reorganization would require 
another act of Congress comparable to the 1986 GNA.  This is improbable, impractical, 
unrealistic and unnecessary.  Instead, an alternative COA presents internal measures 
command level EW organizations can take to restructure for success.   
Recommendations for command level EW organizations internal reorganization 
courses of action are based on two concepts.  The first concept is Galbraith’s contingency 
principlethat there is no one best way to structure an organization (Galbraith, 1977, p. 
28).  The second concept is that successful organizations use frequent reorganizations and 
a mix of formal and quasi-formal structures to effectively adapt to dynamic environments 
(Schoonhoven & Jelinek, 1990, p. 253)  
U.S. military organizations that execute EW within the large DoD structure are 
diverse, geographically separated, and have a long, distinguished history of success 
(Schroer, 2003).  Restructuring such an organization can seem daunting, but has 
precedence for success.  Schoonhoven and Jelenik (1990) provide the example of 
XEROX.  Xerox restructured following several failures in the middle nineteen eighties.  
Staying true to their original mission and strategy, Xerox emerged from the internal 
restructure as a successful company (Schoonhoven & Jelinek, 1990, p. 253).  Taco Bell 
also restructured in the late eighties to become an international powerhouse in the fast 
food industry (Hallowell & Schlesinger, 1991).  An interesting note to the Taco Bell case 
study is that the company’s configuration remained primarily a machine bureaucracy.  
However, a change to the strategic focus combined with internal restructuring of the 
supply line, production procedures, and employee training significantly increased 
consistency, speed, quality, and profits.  Inspired by these examples, the following three 
recommendations are made for restructuring the network of command level EW 
organizations to adapt effectively to the dynamic environment in the twenty-first century. 
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1. Command Authority and EW Recognition Equal to National Priority 
‘Rank has its privileges’ is a popular phrase in the military because it is a fact of 
life.  The military requires good order and discipline to be effective in its mission.  Order 
and discipline are achieved through a formalized chain of command.  Levels of respect, 
professional courtesies, and privileges are earned as rank is achieved and individuals 
progress up the chain of command.  Greater responsibility and authority accompany 
increased rank.  This authority empowers leaders to directly present requirements to 
senior military decision makers.  The combined open systems model analysis revealed 
that EW organizations have difficulty elevating their concerns to senior leadership.  EW 
priorities are not elevated above the bureaucratic noise threshold until people die or war 
is declared.  Restructuring EW can shift the focus to actively prevent EW related 
problems instead of passively delaying reactions until triggered by American loss and 
death. 
Increasing the rank-based authority of senior staff positions is the first and 
arguably the easiest change to the command level EW structure.  In 2003, Michael 
Lawrence in his paper, Organization for Information Operations in the Joint Task Force, 
expressed the necessity for restructuring of the IO community as a whole.  Lawrence 
(2003) recommended an increase in the rank of key individual positions is required if the 
community is to successfully plan and manage IO functions (McLaughlin, 2003).  The 
following are recommendations to elevate the rank-based authority for leaders in key 
command level EW organizations.  The JEWC, as the senior Joint EW organization, 
would be commanded by a minimum of an O7, but preferably an O8 rank equivalent.  
JCEWS, JTF EW staff, and service branch headquarters staff EW commanders would be 
an O6 rank equivalent.  Even though the additional rank does not guarantee primacy of 
concerns, it does provide a more authoritative and direct voice to senior DoD leaders who 
make decisions on long-term plans.  Complimenting the increased rank authority are 
formal structure changes to improve prioritization of EW. 
The JEWC is the largest permanent military staff responsible for coordinating 
EW.  It has the highest rank EW commander at the staff level, is a title-10 Joint 
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organization, and is located in the United States.  Combined, these attributes equip the 
JEWC with potential to be an effective central node to coordinate EW plans and 
management.  This COA recommends the JEWC is formally established as the center 
coordination node for Joint EW by mandating direct coordination.  Mandatory direct 
coordination is formalized in Joint Publications.  Current Joint Publications do not 
formalize coordination with the JEWC.  The JEWC is primarily a support agency to 
COCOM EW operations.  Administratively confined to STRATCOM, JEWC 
coordination by COCOM EW staffs is optional and assistance to elevate theater EW 
problems is minimal.  Geographically displaced JCEWS, JTF EW staff, and service EW 
staffs coordinate with the JEWC ‘as-required’.  The formal mandated relationship 
between the JEWC and the other EW staff components is based on network architecture 
to avoid creation of another bureaucratic layer.   
Internal JEWC restructuring is required to accommodate the increased formal 
relationships.  Once staffed appropriately, the JEWC would be divided into regional 
reporting focus areas to establish continuity and expertise.  Regional EW issues and 
actions will continue to operate within COCOM staff chain of command, but will provide 
parallel coordination with the JEWC.  This formal parallel relationship provides the 
JEWC leadership with situational awareness of global EW issues.  JEWC regional 
reporting areas would meet frequently to create a fusion point for geographically 
displaced EW staffs.  This formalized fusion point can then monitor for trends consistent 
across regions as well as identify regional EW hotspots that require joint level attention.   
Parallel-networked structures provide a formal alternative for EW staff to 
overcome regional bureaucracy.  EW Issues not prioritized appropriately in theater can be 
brought up through Joint channels with the authority of the JEWC commander.  
Simultaneously, the JEWC will consolidate EW related information to develop a 
centralized GOOGLE-like capability for military EW.  Information initially lost through 
direct informal relationships will be included through mandatory coordination.  This 
formalized JEWC structure discussed above and illustrated in Figure 8, will improve the 
process used to share EW information across agencies and continents.   
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Figure 8.   Recommended Command Level EW Structure and Relationships. 
Staffing of the restructured JEWC must take a higher priority in the military 
assignment process in order to establish the basis for the new structure and ensure 
success.  The regional reporting divisions must include air, ground, sea, space, and cyber 
trained EW experts that understand principle electronic protect, exploit, and attack 
capabilities and implications.  If the JEWC is not initially manned correctly, the formal 
coordination structure will fail because the regional command level EW staffs will not 
get the service they require or expect.  If the JEWC fusion center does fail, the growth of 
informal organizations and relationships will again dominate and fractionalize the 
organization. 
Another formal structure recommendation is to mandate that the COCOM 
JCEWS and JTF EW staff be manned appropriately with a compliment of EW trained 
Joint personnel.  Staff complement is similar to the JEWC but is not as robust.  This 
compliment should balance joint EW expertise with regional requirements.  The staff 
should be permanent and commanded by an O6 rank equivalent.  A balanced compliment 
of Joint EW expertise will provide commanders improved staff and requirement 
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recommendations to establish EWCCs.  The multiple pages of tasks formalized by Joint 
publications can be distributed throughout the permanent staff.  Fully staffed JCEWS 
commanded by an O6 rank equivalent can improve EW management and protection 
efforts by forcing tactical units to report equipment using the EME.  The merger of power 
COTS information systems into military application eliminates the possibility that 
individual units will be isolated electronically (Kerr & McCarthy, 2000).  JCEWS must 
be knowledgeable on systems using the EM spectrum within an operating area if they are 
to deconflict EW systems and avoid the electronic mess experienced in Iraq (Atkinson, 
2007). 
The final recommendation is for senior officer to address the obvious disparity 
between U.S. government statements and actions.  Even though the 2006 National 
Security strategy calls for the “unblinking eye” and recognizes the importance of 
information flow on national security (National Security Council, 2006, p. 47, 55), the 
DoD continues to downsize, fractionalize, and marginalize EW issues.  EW programs are 
subject to service branch funding.  Service branch downsizing and budget cuts have 
severely affected EW system availability and expertise.  Currently, the U.S. Air Force is 
minimizing EW expertise under the guise of force-shaping, while the Navy is downsizing 
the EW force as they transition from the two EW position Prowler to the single EW 
position, air centric, technology focused EA-18G Growler (U.S. Air Force Air Staff 
Representative, 2007 and Gershanoff, 2002).  Eventually, the U.S. Marines will lose their 
organic airborne EW capability after the Prowler is retired.  The result of the downsizing 
and budget cuts are seen in the symptoms of EW deficiencies.  The Air Force is further 
dividing EW with the establishment of the Cyber warfare Command separate from EW.   
Stripped of all the fanfare, cyberspace is restrained by the physical limitations of 
the EME.  The cyber world potential affect on information flow and national security is 
enormous; however, the military has created a separate command to counter one weapon.  
Cyber equipment is really just a weapons system, like RADARs or radios that use the 
EME to pass information.  Recent Air Force headquarters discussions are that EW would 
become a subset of the cyber command.  An Air Force Headquarters Staff individual 
involved in the cyber command discussion acknowledged the EW officers involved in the 
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discussion “are concerned about the impact to overall EW development, funding, force 
management if we [EW organizations] are just a subset of computer network operations” 
(U.S. Air Force Air Staff Representative, 2007).  This structure is equivalent to having 
the McDonalds person trained only in making fries running the entire store.  One way to 
overcome this potential structural disparity is to harness EW network power by 
establishing quasi-formal relationships with non-military EW organizations. 
The strongest and most influential non-military EW organization is the 
Congressional EW Working Group (EWWG), headed by Congressmen Joseph R. Pitts.  
The JEWC as the central EW node should establish a standing formal relationship 
through frequent (i.e. quarterly) meetings with the EWWG.  Frequent coordination will 
establish rapport and provide the military community an opportunity to improve the EW 
knowledge on Capital Hill.  Eventually, this relationship should positively affect DoD 
acquisition for vital EW systems.  Recommendations to establish relationships with non-
military EW organizations are extended to professional, commercial EW organizations 
like the Association of Old Crows (AOC).  These organizations have significant political 
influence, commercial network relationships, and financial interest in EW.  Relationships 
with these organizations must be tempered and individuals actively pursing these 
relationships must be cognizant of the biased financial motivations of these organizations.  
Quasi-formal relationships with non-military EW organizations can be mutually 
beneficial for the U.S. military.   
2. Formal Graduate Level Accredited Education 
Success for the command level EW organization’s internal restructuring efforts 
also depends changes to formal EW education.  The Oxford Handbook of Organization 
Theory (2003) states “Organizations today have to be intelligent, have a learning capacity 
built-in.”  (p. 558).  Mandatory training that is standardized by a centralized organization 
can establish the organizational learning capacity required to adapt.  The responsibility of 
the central organization is to manage the training.  The JEWC would assume the role of 
the central organization responsible for graduate level training.   
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Currently, the JEWC training office is developing a formalized training concept.  
(See Appendix F.)16  The concept is in the initial stages of development; therefore, it has 
not matured to include specifics for contextual differentiation and succession 
requirements to ensure minimal overlap between courses.  These recommendations 
expand on the preliminary JEWC concept.   
The training goal is to increase Joint EW and IT system knowledge and minimize 
individual cognitive biases through continuing education.  People cannot be EW experts 
after attending one three-week class.  The centralized Joint EW education system will 
have two sections- continuing education and mandatory training based on assignment.   
EW continuation education training is based on the civilian requirements for 
professional service agencies like teachers, doctors, speech pathologists, etcetera.  
Completion of continuing education related to EW would be required every two to three 
years.  Continuing educational courses will focus on one aspect or a combination of the 
following subjects: EW exploit, attack, and protect considerations; Joint EW systems and 
employment tactics; and new technologies and their affect on EW execution.  Training is 
provided through various means to include seminars, conferences, and the internet.  Most 
continuation training can be accomplished on-line.  The JEWC would annually identify 
accredited courses or conferences approved to fulfill training requirements.  Mandatory 
EW continuation training will be in addition to the current PME structure.   
The second section of the Joint EW education system is mandatory training based 
on job assignment.  This training only will be required prior to or immediately after 
assignment to select command level EW positions.  The JEWC should form an action 
group to identify these positions.  This group would include JCEWS, JTF EW, and 
service branch senior EW staff positions as a minimum.  After completing job specific 
training, a prefix should be added to the individual’s military occupational specialty code.  
This prefix will assist the service assignment people responsible for matching individuals 
to jobs.  Additionally, earning the specialty code will elevate knowledge, standardize 
                                                 
16 Appendix G is a graphical representation of the Berg-Stotts training pyramid (BS Training Pyramid) 
concept.  The concept is unclassified, but it is part of a classified briefing on EW provided by the JEWC.  
For a copy of the BS training pyramid and more information on the training concept, please contact the 
JEWC: Phone: 210-977-5976 / e-mail JEWCTraining@jiowc.osis.gov.   
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experiences and minimize the differences between individuals assigned to key command 
level EW positions.  This will improve the trust and decrease OJT regression as 
individuals PCS.  Individual inconsistencies, lack of trust, and PCS-OJT regression 
cycles were significant misfits identified in the analysis that contributed to EW 
stagnation.   
The JEWC, as the central agency, will manage the training; however, manpower 
limitations mean service branches must actively support and supplement the Joint EW 
education system.  The JEWC will provide some courses; however, service branches will 
need to be the lead agencies on the development and funding of a majority of the 
different courses/conferences.  Each courses/conferences that satisfy the EW education 
requirements must be accredited by the JEWC to ensure currency and applicability.  
Accredited courses/conferences are identified annually on the JEWC website.  If 
required, the list can be updated quarterly. 
Instituting a mandatory education system for the entire U.S. military EW 
community will be extremely challenging and costly in terms of money and time.  
Bolman and Deal (2003) explain that organizations must “invest in employees” if they 
are to be successful (p. 142).  The first requirement for the EW education system to be 
successful is approval by the service branches.  Service branches must formally agree to 
provide support, funding, manpower, and supplement training programs.  Without formal 
support, the system cannot overcome the oppressive bureaucratic structure dividing the 
EW organizations.  Assuming formal support is achieved, the next problem is tracking 
the training.  Tracking can be managed electronically through a properly manned JEWC 
training branch.  After earning an EW associated specialty code, individual names will be 
provided to the JEWC.  The JEWC will identify individuals and establish a web-based 
tracking program.  Consequences for not accomplishing training will have to be 
determined and agreed upon by service branch’s and agencies.   
A mandated, formalized EW education system may seem a daunting task, but if it 
is not instituted the U.S. military will be, if we agree with Greek historian Thucydides, 
“fools”.  He said; "A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its 
warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools" 
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(Thucydides, 2007).  Education is required to keep pace with adversaries that America 
will face in the twenty-first century.  How adversaries use the EME also affects how EW 
organizations should be structured. 
3. Product Based Divisional Structure 
The collective assessment determined that the divisionalized structure of 
command level EW organizations is an acceptable structure to accomplish it task.  The 
diversity of services, complexity of the task, and geographic separation of EW 
organizations require the attention to detail, fast response time, and decentralized 
authority associated with a divisional structure.  However, symptoms of deficiency 
identified in the introduction could mean the current divisional structure is not 
appropriate to meet the EW demands of the twenty-first century.   
Burton and Obel (1998) recommend the sequential order to divide labor is 
“products, markets, and customers” (p. 45).  Currently, EW labor is divided by customer 
first, then market, and finally product.  EW customer labor division is the largest and 
broadest.  EW equipment and personnel is divided by type of EW mission (ES, EA, EP).  
The assigned specialty code and initial job specific training represents this labor division.  
Market labor division is represented by the geographic commands.  Finally, the third 
labor division is by product, which is based presently on the individual service 
capabilities17.  Though this division of labor order was effective in the past, but it is not 
today.   
The military service based bureaucratic structure of EW is not able to adapt 
quickly or economically to the various dynamic inputs.  Environmental changes with the 
hybridization of military and commercial systems; fourth generation warfare evolution; 
and exponential growth in information technology all have contributed to the problems 
                                                 
17 An following is an example to illustrate the EW labor division order:  Individuals are first trained in 
electronic warfare and given an EW specialty code.  They are further trained in the attack mission, which 
adds a mission designator to their specialty code.  Customers requiring EA would request this person.  The 
coded individual is the assigned to a unit in a COCOM or functional command.  This assignment provides 
the market where the individual executes the mission for the customer.  Finally, the individual is trained on 
a specific piece of equipment or to perform a specific capability.  In this case, the EC-130H COMPASS 
CALL.  This is the product.  Combined this is stated as the customer requests an EA mission in the Europe 
market using the EC-130H COMPASS CALL product. 
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experienced by EW.  IT evolutions have disruptive capabilities that require changes in 
EW warfare concepts.  The impact of the machine gun on battlefield strategy is 
equivalent to the impact IT has on the EW battlefield.  The U.S. DoD can no longer 
expect to line up in unprotected electronic rows and fire off electrons at a known enemy 
without taking severe electronic and physical casualties.  To avoid information casualties, 
it is recommended that the divisional structure of the EW community be internally 
modified in the order suggested by Burton and Obel (1998, p. 45): products, markets, and 
then customers. 
The current paradigm for the EW product is that individual widgets owned by the 
service branches and used to execute the tactical EW mission is the product.  Command 
level EW organizations plan and manage these products.  It is recommended to change 
the product paradigm from service specific to a functional concept.  Instead of identifying 
individual systems, the product is defined by the impact of the information system on the 
EM and physical environments.  The product considers the amount of EM spectrum 
covered and the physical effective range of the system.  The product division is further 
divided into global, regional, national, and local sub-division.  Global EW will focus on 
information systems that have a universal reach like the internet; cyber world; and long 
wavelength, low frequency communications systems.  Regional EW concentrates on 
information systems that cross sovereign boundaries, but are constrained to global 
regions.  These systems include Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) cell 
phones, satellite communications with limited footprints like THURAYA, and localized 
global positioning systems (GPS).  National EW systems are systems tied exclusively to a 
particular nation, which includes Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), airborne EW 
counter measures and specific military or commercial systems only used in that nation.  
Finally, the focus of the local sub-division is on information systems with limited range 
and not tied exclusively to a specific nation.  Local systems include infrared spectrum 
devises, lasers, high-powered cordless phones, and portable family radio systems.  EW 




EW mission.  Education would provide comprehensive understanding of system 
applications, identify system vulnerabilities to attack and exploitation and will inform 
users about interoperability issues with other information warfare systems.   
The rationale for placing this type of product as the primary divider of EW labor 
is information systems used and protected by the U.S. are also the same systems that are 
attacked or exploited.  Having a working knowledge of the system as a whole will allow 
better defense, exploitation, and attacking strategies required to maintain the information 
advantage.  Migration from service system based to functional product based education is 
not easy.  It requires substantial, but achievable, modifications to the current 
undergraduate EW educational system.  The recommended continuing education system 
can complement the undergraduate efforts to make this paradigm shift successful. 
The labor divisions of markets and customers would not require any paradigm 
shifts or modifications to the existing infrastructure.  Markets would remain the 
secondary division of labor and be divided by geographic regions.  This division allows 
regional flexibility and has proven fairly effective to ensure regional expertise and reach 
of the limited assets within the bureaucratic constraints of the DoD.  The customer would 
be the tertiary division and would remain structured by the EW mission required.  
Customers wanting EA would still work with EA specialists.  The difference in the new 
structure is the EA expert will now be a regional expert with knowledge of other assets 
and affect the tactical EA mission requested will have on operations. 
4. Recommendation Final Thoughts 
The recommendations for restructuring take advantage of the JEWC as the central 
EW node.  It is important to provide a centralize network for command level EW 
organizations to plan and manage EW to adapt effectively to twenty-first century 
dynamic environments.  What is not recommended is to further divide the EW mission.  
The efforts, already discussed, of the USAF to stand up a separate cyber command 
further divides the EW mission.  The advantage of separating CNO from the rest of EW 
is that CNO has a direct link to the decision makers.  Therefore, CNO is automatically 
elevated above the bureaucratic noise threshold.  Once above the noise threshold, money 
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and manpower are thrown the organization’s way.  Increased money and manpower do 
not always equal success.  The creation of a separate Cyber Command does ensure 
creation of another organizational stovepipe; increased rivalries over limited resources 
and defined areas of responsibilities; and more barriers to coordination.  The impact of 
dividing organizations coordinating EW is seen in Washington Post columnist Rick 
Atkinson’s (Atkinson, 2007) article on the counter-IED mission.  The DoD created the 
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to counter IED’s.  Seventy-five plus people and 
a billion-dollar budget comprises JIEDDO, which developed a mission to drive the 
terrorist off the airways and “back to the wire.”  The result was an initial EW success; 
however, efforts only marginalized a small portion of the IED threat.  While the terrorists 
become more experienced and deadlier with the institution of explosively formed 
penetrator’s (EFP), interoperability issues and inter-service rivalries, created by 
disjointed acquisition structure, degrade U.S. effectiveness.   
Purposely not addressed in this section is the movement of EW from the J3 
Operations IO Cell to the Effects Cell.  Libicki’s (1995) argument that EW is “tactical at 
best” because of its limitations supports the movement of EW from the strategic IO cell 
to the tactical effects cell (Ch. 11, p. 2).  Additionally, the lack of authority and 
bureaucratic layering under the IO cell has proven to degrade effectiveness of EW to 
accomplish its tasks.  Active debates on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
movement within the joint organizational structure are heated.  Based on this analysis, the 
problems with effectively planning and managing EW cannot be solved by just being 
administratively assigned to the IO Cell.  There are fundamental flaws in the EW design 
structure that must be first addressed, as a joint community, if it is to be successful.  
Lateral administrative shifts will not alone over come these challenges.  
The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Theory (2003) states “the emphasis [on 
current organizational structure] is on a shift from older, more imperative methods of 
managerial fiat, based on prescription, command, and control, to empowerment, 
teamwork, and networked relations” (p. 558).  Adversarial forces also use many of the 
information systems used by the U.S.  This means systems that America attacks or 
exploits are also systems the U.S. must spend time protecting.  Contributing factors such 
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as cost, scarcity of assets, classification restrictions within the community, inter-service 
rivalries, slow acquisition process, training deficiencies, and authoritative limitations 
further complicates command level EW organizations’ task to effectively plan and 
manage EW.  Overcoming these challenges must be a joint effort with empowered teams 
connected by networks.   
B. CONCLUSION 
Acting as the cardiovascular system of the United States military, Electronic 
Warfare organizations ensures information flows like oxygen from and across the 
forward lines, Department of Defense, and National Command Authority.  The 2006 
National Security Strategy recognized that maintaining the information flow advantage is 
vital to the nation’s national security (p. 47).  Exploitation failures prior to the 2001 
terrorist bombings, attack problems encountered in the C-RCIED campaign, and 
protection vulnerabilities exposed by TITAN RAIN demonstrate symptoms of EW 
decline and loss of information flow advantage.  Command level EW organizations are 
formally tasked by joint publications to manage and plan EW to maintain information 
flow advantages and protect national security.  This thesis used the combined open 
systems model and Burton and Obel’s (1998) ORGCON expert system to analyze the 
congruence of command level EW organizations within the DoD structure.   
The collaborative assessment identified multiple fit issues between the EW 
structure and its assigned task of EME control.  These misfits are interpreted as an 
organizational failure to adequately adjust to the dynamic inputs of evolutionary changes 
in the conduct of warfare, communication technology; and the hybridization of military 
and commercial communication systems.  Conclusions state that these misfits were a 
result of an unachievable strategic task, weak authoritative command structure, 
inadequate formal training and education, and an ineffective divisional structure.   
Recommendations to compensate for these misfits were presented with the 
understanding of the constraints of the bureaucratic environment within which command 
level EW organizations operate.  Analyses recommended a centralized, yet flexible 
structure to facilitate the organization to accomplish tasks and adapt to the dynamic 
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environment.  Symantec changes to the strategic tasks, modifications to EW leadership 
rank structure, formalized graduate level EW training, and reprioritizing EW 
divisionalized structure on a product-based system will facilitate adaptation to future 
changes.   
Implementing change is not easy, especially in a bureaucratic system.  Individual 
observations and recommendations presented will be challenged; however, the 
background and symptoms provided make it hard to deny that current command level 
EW organizations have stagnated and are struggling to achieve their task of EME control.  
If the U.S. is to remain, a powerful nation state it must maintain its information flow 
advantage in the twenty first century throughout the range of military operations.  
Changes in the planning and management of EW are required now before the symptoms 
get worse.  Failure to implement corrective changes to command level EW planning and 
management can lead to the U.S. military being physically defeated because it was 
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APPENDIX C.  JP 3-13.1 DEFINED JCEWS RESPONSIBILITIES  
Reference: (JP 3-13.1, 2007, pp. II-4-II-6) 
 
(1) Specific functions and responsibilities of a JCEWS: 
(a) Be familiar with EW support to current theater OPLANs and CONPLANs 
(b) Prepare EW portion of estimates and tabs to joint force OPLANs 
(c) Formulate and recommend EW targets to support the JFC OPLAN 
(d) Implement EW policies 
 
(2) Functions and responsibilities common to JCEWS and joint EWCC (When a JCEWS 
and joint EWCC exist at the same level, the owning commander must decide command 
and coordination relationships between the two organizations). 
(a) Provide EW planning and coordination expertise to the JFC. Develop a daily 
EW battle-rhythm that supports EW planning and operations requirements 
(b) Prepare the EW portion of estimates and tabs for operation orders (OPORDs) 
and identify authorities necessary to implement the OPORD 
(c) Identify requirements for intelligence support to joint EW operations, 
including assistance to the J-2 in planning the collection and dissemination of ES 
information 
(d) Define and develop intelligence requirements to support EW operations 
(e) Coordinate with ISR assets and national agencies in assessing hostile EW 
capabilities 
and limitations  
(f) Coordinate with ISR and national resources to weigh intelligence gain/loss of 
EA or 
the physical destruction of targets, and if necessary, coordinate the resolution of 
these conflicts. Resolution of intelligence gain/loss conflicts resides with the JFC. 
(g) Plan, coordinate, and assess defensive EA requirements 
(h) Maintain current assessment of the EW resources available to the JFC (to 
include 
number, type, and status of EW assets) and analyze what resources are necessary 
to accomplish the JFC’s objective 
(i) Assist JFC by recommending the level of EW support required of the 
component 
commanders 
(j) Prioritize EW targets based on the JFC’s objectives, EW plan and available 
assets 
(k) Represent EW within the IO cell to formulate and recommend to the joint 
targeting 
coordination board EW targets to support the JFC’s plan 
(l) Predict effects of friendly and enemy EW activity on joint and multinational 
operations using applicable modeling and simulation tools 
(m) Plan, coordinate, and assess EP (e.g., EW deconfliction, EMCON, EW 
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reprogramming) 
(n) Assist JFMO in conjunction with JFC J-2, J-3, J-6, other government agencies, 
joint special operations center, components, and allies in resolving spectrum 
conflicts that JFMO or JCEWS are unable to resolve 
(o) Carry out responsibilities of the jamming control authority (JCA) 
(p) Coordinate and monitor joint coordination EW reprogramming (JCEWR) by 
identifying where EW reprogramming decisions and reprogramming actions 
affect joint force tactical operations and disseminating theater-wide EW plans as 
required 
(q) Recommend and promulgate EW special instructions and rules of engagement 
(ROE) 
(r) Plan, coordinate, integrate, and deconflict EW in current and future operations 
taking in consideration nontraditional capabilities (e.g., IO, space, special 
operations, and STO) within the operational area 
(s) Compile and coordinate EW support requests from all components according 
to the priorities set by the JFC 
(t) Coordinate through the chain of command to resolve any 
component/multinational EW requests that cannot be solved at the JCEWS or 
joint EWCC level 
(u) Monitor and adapt execution of EW plans in current operations and exercises 
(v) Archive EW planning and execution data and document EW lessons learned in 
accordance with the joint lessons learned program 
 
(3) Joint EWCC Support Requirements. When activated, the EWCC should be located in 
or have access to a special compartmented information facility to permit thorough 
accomplishment of its coordinating functions. Optimal joint EWCC staffing will dictate 
the inclusion of STO cleared personnel in order to coordinate and deconflict STO issues. 
The joint EWCC will also have requirements for administrative, intelligence, logistics, 
legal and communications support. 
(a) Administrative. Administrative support will include, but not be limited to, 
clerical assistance, classified material control, publications management, update, 
maintenance and display of operational SIGINT data, and the provision of general 
administrative materials. 
(b) Intelligence. The joint EWCC will require all-source intelligence information 
to maintain full knowledge of an opposing force’s intentions and capabilities. 
Intelligence support will include specific and detailed combat information, 
intelligence, and ES information for example: opposing force electronic systems; 
scheme of maneuver; communications system capabilities and deployment; 
electronic-dependent weapon systems capabilities and deployment; as well as EW 
activities, and SIGINT collection plans of friendly units. The J-2 will coordinate 
with theater EW units to ensure mission reports are received in a timely manner 
and disseminated to the staff and other agencies as required. 
(c) Logistics. Logistic support for the joint EWCC includes, but is not limited to: 
storage containers for classified material; desks; maps; information display 
facilities; messing and billeting of assigned personnel. 
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(d) Communications. The Joint EWCC should advise J-6 of the staff’s 
communication 
requirements. These requirements depend directly on the level of EW activities 
involved in joint task force (JTF) operations. Provisions must be made for secure, 
reliable, and timely communications support. The joint EWCC should be able to 
communicate with both component EW authorities/agencies and appropriate 
external authorities concerning coordination of EW activities. The joint EWCC 
must also be able to communicate with coalition partners within releasability 
restraints. 
(e) Legal. Support for the joint EWCC includes legal support to review and obtain 
the necessary authorities and to review the plan for compliance with ROE and 
applicable domestic and international law, including law of armed conflict 
(LOAC). 
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APPENDIX D.  ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RESULTS 
Reference: (Burton et al., 1998) 
 
UP TO AND INCLUDING GULF WAR (1991) 
 
Output” 
REPORT SUMMARY - Command Level EW 
 
Time: 9:05:02 PM,  10/15/2007 
Scenario: 1986-1991 (Gulf War)                                         
 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY  
 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about 
your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's 
current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to 
the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, 
management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The writeup below 
summarizes the input data for the analysis.  
 
- Command Level EW has a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a large number of different jobs (cf 100). 
- Of the employees at Command Level EW 76 to 100 % have an advanced degree or 
many years of special training (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 6 to 8 vertical levels separating top management from the 
bottom level of the organization (cf 100). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 6 to 8 (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 16 to 30 separate geographic locations (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's average distance of these separate units from the organization's 
headquarters is more than 3500 miles (cf 100). 
- 61 to 90 % of Command Level EW's total workforce is located at these separate units 
(cf 100). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to ensure 
compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 100). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100). 
- 41 to 60 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or 
procedures for their job (cf 100). 
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent (cf 100). 
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- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and 
policies when they make decisions (cf 100). 
- More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in 
writing (cf 100). 
- Top Management is to a great extent involved in gathering the information they will use 
in making decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of 61 to 80 % of the information 
input (cf 100). 
- Top management directly controls 61 to 80 % of the decisions executed (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 
100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated 
(cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel 
(cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has no discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary 
increases and promotions) (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and 
supplies (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing a new project or 
program (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how work exceptions are to be 
handled (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 500 employees (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's age is mature (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's ownership status is public (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has many different products (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has many different markets (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW operates at a high-activity level in more countries (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has an undetermined number of different products in the foreign 
markets (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's major activity is categorized as service (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a standard high-volume service technology (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a medium routine technology (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's technology is somewhat divisible (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's technology dominance is average (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has either planned or already has an advanced information system 
(cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty of Command Level EW's environment is low (cf 100). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is low (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's environment has a high hostility (cf 100). 
- Top management prefers to make resource allocations and detailed operating decisions 
(cf 100). 
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- Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 
100). 
- Top management has a preference for very detailed information when making decisions 
(cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions 
(cf 100). 
- Top management is risk averse (cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for high control (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW operates in an industry with a high capital requirement (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a medium product innovation (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a low process innovation (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a high concern for quality (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100). 
- The level of trust is low (cf 100). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf 100). 
- The employee morale is medium (cf 100). 
- Rewards are given in a not known fashion (cf 100). 
- The resistance to change is high (cf 100). 
- The leader credibility is medium (cf 100). 
- The level of scapegoating is medium (cf 100). 
 
THE SIZE  
 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of 
employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large 
(cf 100). 
 
More than 75 % of the people employed by Command Level EW have a high level of 
education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is 
greater than 2,000 and Command Level EW is categorized as large. 
 
THE CLIMATE  
 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a 
internal process climate (cf 79). 
 
 
The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures 
govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and 
organizers.  Maintaining a smooth running organization is important. The long-term 
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concerns are stability, predictability, and efficiency. Formal rules and policies hold the 
organization together. 
 
When the organization has a low level of trust, it is likely that the organization has a 
internal process climate. Employees with a medium to low morale is frequently one 
element of an internal process climate. High resistance to change is normally present in a 
internal process climate. 
 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE  
 
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; 
managers have a high preference for microinvolvement.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a 
high preference for microinvolvement (cf 82). 
 
It could also be that your management profile has a medium preference (cf 78). 
 
 
Since the management has a preference for being very involved in gathering and using 
detailed information when making decisions, a high preference for microinvolvement 
characterization is appropriate. Management is risk averse. This is one of the 
characteristics of a manager with a high preference for microinvolvement. Management 
has a preference for using control to coordinate activities, which leads toward a high 
preference for microinvolvement.  
 
The management of Command Level EW has a preference for letting some decisions be 
made by other managers. This will lead toward a medium preference for 
microinvolvement. Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when 
making decisions, which characterizes a preference for a medium microinvolvement. The 
management of Command Level EW has a preference for taking actions on some 
decisions and being reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference 
for microinvolvement. 
 
THE STRATEGY  
 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with 
innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow 
Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned 
to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of 
what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is 




An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that 
combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of 
a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. It has a dual technology core. 
For a medium routine technology, Command Level EW has some flexibility. It is 
consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an 
analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Command Level EW. 
 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization 
have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be 
recommendations for the organization.  
 
The current organizational complexity is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current vertical differentiation is medium (cf 100). 
 
 
The current spatial differentiation is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current centralization is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current formalization is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
 
 
SITUATION MISFITS  
 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.  
 
 102 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
 
When the equivocality of Command Level EW's environment is low, the analyzer with 
innovation strategy may not be a suitable one! With low equivocality, the environment is 
well known and understood.  An innovative strategy works best when the environment 
offers new opportunities for products and services.  Here such opportunities are limited.  
However, process innovation which reduces costs is appropriate. 
Command Level EW has an internal process climate. This is a mismatch with analyzer 
with innovation strategy! An internal process climate is internally oriented with a focus 
on control.  Innovation is difficult to achieve with this orientation. More flexibility and a 
more external orientation are desirable for innovation. An internal process climate 
supports better an analyzer without innovation and defender strategy. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the 
greatest certainty factor from the analyses above  Organizational Consultant has derived 
recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS  
 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a 
divisional configuration (cf 85). 
 
It is certainly not: a professional bureaucracy (cf -1). 
 
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -100). 
 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit grouping into 
relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, (product, customer, or 
geographical grouping). 
When the organization is large, the configuration can be a divisional configuration. 
Because the organization has many products, the configuration should be divisional. The 
configuration should be divisional when the equivocality of Command Level EW's 
environment is not high and the complexity is not low. The divisionalization of 
Command Level EW may be based on products or product groups. The divisionalization 
of Command Level EW may be based on markets. The divisional configuration may be a 
multi-domestic structure.  
Because the technology is not fully divisible, care should be taken in recommending a 
divisional configuration.  
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A professional bureaucracy is a less likely configuration when top management has a 
high preference for microinvolvement.  
When the organization has high hostility, it is unlikely to be a machine bureaucracy. A 
machine bureaucracy will prevent it from acting appropriately when unexpected events 
occur. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 53). 
 
It, too, could be: low (cf 45). 
 
Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational complexity. 
Command Level EW has a technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the 
organizational complexity should be medium. When the uncertainty of Command Level 
EW's environment is low, the organizational complexity should neither be very low nor 
very high so that Command Level EW will be able to react quickly when the 
environment changes. Because Command Level EW has an advanced information 
system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise.  
 
When the environmental hostility of Command Level EW is high, organizational 
complexity should be low. Top management of Command Level EW has a preference for 
a high level of microinvolvement, which leads to lower organizational complexity.  
 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 45). 
 
 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 72). 
 
 
The recommended degree of formalization is high (cf 67). 
 
There should be high formalization between the organizational units but less 
formalization within the units due to the high professionalization. When the organization 
uses an advanced information system, formalization should be high. Command Level EW 
has a high capital requirement, which leads to high formalization. Large organizations 
should have high formalization. High formalization is consistent with top management's 
preference for a high level of microinvolvement. An internal process climate in the 
organization requires a high level of formalization.  
 
The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 57). 
 
There is evidence against it should be: low (cf -2). 
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When there is a high capital requirement and the product innovation is medium,  as is the 
case for Command Level EW, centralization should be rather high to obtain efficiency. 
When the environment is hostile, prompt actions by top management may be required 
and high centralization should be considered. High centralization is required if top 
management has a preference for a high level of microinvolvement. Because Command 
Level EW has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could 
otherwise. An internal process climate in the organization requires a medium to high 
level of centralization.  
 
 
Command Level EW's span of control should be moderate (cf 62). 
 
Since Command Level EW has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate 
span of control.  
 
Command Level EW should use media with low media richness (cf 100). 
 
 
The information media that Command Level EW uses should provide a moderate amount 
of information (cf 85). 
 
 
Incentives should be based on procedures (cf 85). 
 
 
Command Level EW should use rules as means for coordination and control (cf 88). 
 
With low equivocality, low uncertainty, and high complexity in Command Level EW's 
environment, coordination and control should be rules and procedures. A moderate 
amount of information must be considered, although it need not be rich for this low 
uncertainty and low equivocality environment. Incentives should be based on procedure, 
thus focusing on performing activities well.  Coordination within each division is very 
important. Coordination between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top 
management, which is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds 
between (among) the divisions.  Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing 
technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison managers and 
technology committees are possible coordination mechanisms. Conferences among 
technical professionals can be very effective. 
 
The recommended structure for Command Level EW is a divisional structure. This 
structure requires a top management, which will pay attention to strategic issues and 
problems. The top management's preference for a high microinvolvement does not fit 




ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS  
 
Organizational misfits compare the recommended organization with the current 
organization.  
 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
 
Current and prescribed configuration do not match. 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match. 
 
 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
No detailed recommendations present (cf 100). 
 
 












REPORT SUMMARY - Command Level EW 
 
Time: 9:16:56 PM,  10/15/2007 
Scenario: Post 1991-2007                                               
 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY  
 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about 
your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's 
current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to 
the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, 
management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The writeup below 
summarizes the input data for the analysis.  
 
- Command Level EW has a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a large number of different jobs (cf 100). 
- Of the employees at Command Level EW 76 to 100 % have an advanced degree or 
many years of special training (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 6 to 8 vertical levels separating top management from the 
bottom level of the organization (cf 100). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 6 to 8 (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 16 to 30 separate geographic locations (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's average distance of these separate units from the organization's 
headquarters is more than 3500 miles (cf 100). 
- 61 to 90 % of Command Level EW's total workforce is located at these separate units 
(cf 100). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to ensure 
compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 100). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100). 
- 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or 
procedures for their job (cf 100). 
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent (cf 100). 
- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and 
policies when they make decisions (cf 100). 
- More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in 
writing (cf 100). 
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- Top Management is to a great extent involved in gathering the information they will use 
in making decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of 61 to 80 % of the information 
input (cf 100). 
- Top management directly controls more than 80 % of the decisions executed (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 
100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated 
(cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel 
(cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary 
increases and promotions) (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and 
supplies (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project or 
program (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over how work exceptions are to be 
handled (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has 500 employees (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's age is mature (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's ownership status is public (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has many different products (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has many different markets (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW operates at a high-activity level in more countries (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has an undetermined number of different products in the foreign 
markets (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's major activity is categorized as service (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a specialized customer-oriented service technology (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a medium routine technology (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's technology is highly divisible (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's technology dominance is strong (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has either planned or already has an advanced information system 
(cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty of Command Level EW's environment is high (cf 100). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is high (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's environment is extremely hostile (cf 100). 
- Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 
100). 
- Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 
100). 
- Top management has a preference for very detailed information when making decisions 
(cf 100). 
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- Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions 
(cf 100). 
- Top management is risk averse (cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for high control (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW operates in an industry with a high capital requirement (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a medium product innovation (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a medium process innovation (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW has a high concern for quality (cf 100). 
- Command Level EW's price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100). 
- The level of trust is medium (cf 100). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf 100). 
- The employee morale is medium (cf 100). 
- Rewards are given in a not known fashion (cf 100). 
- The resistance to change is high (cf 100). 
- The leader credibility is medium (cf 100). 
- The level of scapegoating is high (cf 100). 
 
THE SIZE  
 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of 
employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large 
(cf 100). 
 
More than 75 % of the people employed by Command Level EW have a high level of 
education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is 
greater than 2,000 and Command Level EW is categorized as large. 
 
THE CLIMATE  
 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a 
internal process climate (cf 79). 
 
 
The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures 
govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and 
organizers.  Maintaining a smooth running organization is important. The long-term 




Employees with a medium to low morale is frequently one element of an internal process 
climate. High resistance to change is normally present in a internal process climate. An 
organization with a high level of scapegoating may have an internal process climate. 
 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE  
 
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; 
managers have a high preference for microinvolvement.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a 
high preference for microinvolvement (cf 82). 
 
 
Since the management has a preference for being very involved in gathering and using 
detailed information when making decisions, a high preference for microinvolvement 
characterization is appropriate. Management is risk averse. This is one of the 
characteristics of a manager with a high preference for microinvolvement. Management 
has a preference for using control to coordinate activities, which leads toward a high 
preference for microinvolvement. 
 
THE STRATEGY  
 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with 
innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow 
Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned 
to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of 
what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is 
an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 81). 
 
 
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that 
combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of 
a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. It has a dual technology core. 
For a medium routine technology, Command Level EW has some flexibility. It is 
consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an 
analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Command Level EW. 
 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
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Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization 
have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be 
recommendations for the organization.  
 
The current organizational complexity is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current vertical differentiation is medium (cf 100). 
 
 
The current spatial differentiation is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current centralization is medium (cf 100). 
 
 
The current formalization is high (cf 100). 
 
 
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
 
 
SITUATION MISFITS  
 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.  
 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
 
Command Level EW is a large organization with a complex and dynamic environment. 
This may not fit with the managements preference for a high level of microinvolvement! 
With a complex and dynamic environment, there are a very large number of changing 
situations to which to adjust. Management cannot access all the situations, analyze what 
needs to be done and  oversee the implementation. There is simply too much to do; there 
is too much information to deal with. A high level of microinvolvement will usually lead 
to an information overload at the top and a delay in action when it is most needed. 
Despite a tendency for management to become even more involved in details, the 
situation requires less microinvolvement and alternative approaches, such as more 
decentralization. 
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Command Level EW has an internal process climate. This may cause problems in a high 
or moderately high equivocal environment! An internal process climate focuses more on 
the inside of the organization than on the outside. In an equivocal environment which is 
likely to require change and adaptation, the internal process climate may not either see 
the shift, understand the need for change and does not have an organization which 
supports adaptation to such needed change. There is high resistance to change. An 
equivocal environment requires an external orientation which is found in the rational goal 
and development climates. 
Command Level EW has an internal process climate. This is a mismatch with analyzer 
with innovation strategy! An internal process climate is internally oriented with a focus 
on control.  Innovation is difficult to achieve with this orientation. More flexibility and a 
more external orientation are desirable for innovation. An internal process climate  
supports better an analyzer without innovation and defender strategy. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the 
greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational Consultant has derived 
recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS  
 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a 
divisional configuration (cf 85). 
 
It is certainly not: a professional bureaucracy (cf -1). 
 
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -100). 
 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit grouping into 
relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, (product, customer, or 
geographical grouping). 
When the organization is large, the configuration can be a divisional configuration. 
Because the organization has many products, the configuration should be divisional. The 
divisionalization of Command Level EW may be based on products or product groups. 
The divisionalization of Command Level EW may be based on markets. The divisional 
configuration may be a multi-domestic structure.  
 
 
A professional bureaucracy is a less likely configuration when top management has a 
high preference for microinvolvement.  
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When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. 
A machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 78). 
 
Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental uncertainty and 
the environmental equivocality of Command Level EW are high. In this situation, the 
organizational complexity should be low. This allows the organization to adapt quickly. 
When the environmental hostility of Command Level EW is high, organizational 
complexity should be low. Top management of Command Level EW has a preference for 
a high level of microinvolvement, which leads to lower organizational complexity.  
 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 78). 
 
 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 89). 
 
 
The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 68). 
 
It, too, could be: high (cf 59). 
 
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known and 
since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and procedures can 
be developed, which implies that Command Level EW's formalization should be low. 
When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low.  
 
There should be high formalization between the organizational units but less 
formalization within the units due to the high professionalization. When the organization 
uses an advanced information system, formalization should be high. Command Level EW 
has a high capital requirement, which leads to high formalization. Large organizations 
should have high formalization. High formalization is consistent with top management's 
preference for a high level of microinvolvement. An internal process climate in the 
organization requires a high level of formalization.  
 
The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 83). 
 
There is evidence against it should be: low (cf -4). 
 
When there is a high capital requirement and the product innovation is medium, as is the 
case for Command Level EW, centralization should be rather high to obtain efficiency. 
When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action 
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and centralization must be high. High centralization is required if top management has a 
preference for a high level of microinvolvement. Because Command Level EW has an 
advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise. An 




Command Level EW's span of control should be moderate (cf 62). 
 
Since Command Level EW has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate 
span of control.  
 
Command Level EW should use media with high media richness (cf 70). 
 
 
The information media that Command Level EW uses should provide a large amount of 
information (cf 70). 
 
 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 70). 
 
 
Command Level EW should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 85). 
 
It should also use planning (cf 75). 
 




When the environment of Command Level EW has high equivocality, high uncertainty, 
and high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through integrators and 
group meetings. The richness of the media should be high with a large amount of 
information. Incentives must be results based. Coordination within each division is very 
important. Coordination between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top 
management, which is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds 
between (among) the divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing 
technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison managers and 
technology committees are possible coordination mechanisms. Conferences among 
technical professionals can be very effective. 
 
The recommended structure for Command Level EW is a divisional structure. This 
structure requires a top management, which will pay attention to strategic issues and 
problems. The top management's preference for a high microinvolvement does not fit 
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with the divisional structure. It will likely turn out to be a corrupted divisional structure 
(Williamson, 1975). 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS  
 
Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current 
organization.  
 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
 
Current and prescribed configuration do not match. 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match. 
Current and prescribed centralization do not match. 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
 
 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100). 
 
 
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are 
available. 
You may consider supervising the employees less closely. 
You may consider allowing employees more latitude from standards. 
You may consider fewer written job descriptions. 
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and 
procedures. 
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures. 





APPENDIX E.  BERG-STOTTS EW EDUCATIONAL CONCEPT 
“THE BS PYRAMID” 
 
(From: Berg, 2007) 
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